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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures." 1 An intentional shooting of a free
citizen is a "seizure" governed by the objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment permits police to use deadly force when there is an
imminent threat of serious bodily harm or death to themselves or others.
Although the governing standard is well established in a general way, its application to
particular facts and circumstances may not be clear to officers on the street. Unless a reasonable
police officer would have understood that his/her decision to shoot was clearly constitutionally
prohibited, the officer may be entitled to qualified immunity, a decision that the court can make
on summary judgment before trial. Discussed first are shootings that are not subject to Fourth
Amendment review: shots that do not seize a subject because they miss or are accidental; and
shootings of those already in confinement, who are protected by the higher "intent to harm" and
"malicious and sadistic" standards of the Due Process Clause2 and the Eighth Amendment.3
Discussed next are the most common fact patterns involving police shootings: a subject armed
with a gun, armed with an edged weapon (e.g., knife), using a motor vehicle as a weapon,
apparently reaching for a weapon, engaged in a violent struggle, or fleeing.
Discussed last are recurring Fourth Amendment issues, namely: whether pointing without
shooting is excessive force; when an off-duty officer is operating under the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment; if an officer can be relieved from the requirement that he/she give a warning
before shooting; when firing multiple times constitutes excessive force; and whether written
police policies and procedures, the existence of less-than-lethal alternatives, and events leading
up to the shooting are pertinent to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. The issue of
when Fourth Amendment scrutiny attaches in an intentional, self-defense police shooting case is
an important and unsettled area of federal law.
These questions help frame the discussion:
(1) Was the Fourth Amendment involved? For a shooting to be a seizure, it must
have seized its intended target, a subject police are trying to arrest or detain.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The civil enforcement mechanism for state actors' violations of the Fourth Amendment
is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.... For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person deprived him/her of a federally
protected right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).2U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1("... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law").
' U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII ("... nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
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Accidental shootings, the shooting of unintended third parties, and the
shooting of escapees from pretrial detention or convicted prisoners do not
implicate the Fourth Amendment.
(2) Was the shooting objectively reasonable? A police officer may use deadly
force (i.e., shoot) if he/she reasonably fears imminent serious bodily harm or
death. Serious bodily harm includes severe tissue damage, broken bones,
major disfigurement, or permanent paralysis or impairment.
(3) Did the officer stop shooting when the threat was over? Whether or not the
force was excessive does not depend on the number of shots fired, but whether
they were fired while the threat was imminent.
(4) Did the defense raise qualified immunity for individual officers? Even an
officer whose conduct violated the "objective reasonableness" standard of the
Fourth Amendment may avail himself/herself of the defense. Unless the law
clearly established that deadly force could not be used under the same or
similar circumstances, the shooter may be entitled to summary judgment.
Many of the cases discuss qualified immunity before trial on summary
judgment, but it should be noted that the defense remains viable through trial.
(5) Did the plaintiff rely on state law and police department directives to show the
unreasonableness of the shooting? These can be more restrictive than the
Constitution. A violation of a regulation may bear on common law negligence
and subject the officer to discipline, but it does not establish a constitutional
violation.
(6) Did the plaintiffs theory depend on what might have been done differently
prior to the shooting to prevent it? Case law emphasizes the moment of the
shooting itself. At the point the threat is imminent officers are justified in
shooting. Officers do not have to disengage or retreat. They, at least, may be
entitled to judgment in their favor.
(7) Even though the shooting officer was entitled to qualified immunity, there
may still have been an underlying Fourth Amendment violation. Did the
plaintiff raise mistakes in planning or poor direction in the field as a basis for
holding supervisors liable for the incident? Something more than mere
negligence, "deliberate indifference" or more, is required to establish
supervisory liability.
(8) Did the plaintiff seek to impose liability on the municipality? 4 Most often the
municipal claim in a shooting case will be premised on inadequate training. If
the municipality was aware of the risk that the type of shooting at issue was
reasonably likely to occur and provided training in preparation for it, the
plaintiff probably could not establish the requisite "deliberate indifference. "5
Police departments may require firearms training that includes simulated
police-citizen deadly force ("shoot/don't shoot") scenarios.
4 Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). To hold the municipality liable, the plaintiff must show that
a municipal policy or custom caused the constitutional violation. Id. at 694.
5 Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989). To establish fault for inadequate training (or recruitment, supervision, or discipline), the plaintiff must
prove that municipal policymakers engaged in a policy of consciously disregarding known risks that police officers
would violate the rights of citizens with whom they had contact. Harris, 489 U.S. at 388.
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1. Supreme Court Standards
As the following discussion illustrates, a shooting is a "seizure" subject to the
reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. To justify the use of deadly force, there must
be an imminent threat of serious bodily harm or death to the shooting officer or others. If the
shooting is objectively reasonable, the Fourth Amendment is not violated. Further, individual
police officers may invoke the defense of qualified immunity if, under the fact-specific setting of
the incident, the shooting did not violate clearly established law.
A. Seizure
The Supreme Court has defined "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. A "seizure"
triggering the Fourth Amendment's protections occurs when government actors have, "by means
of physical force or show of authority,... in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen."6 In
United States v. Mendenhall,7 the Court stated: "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." 8 In Brower v. County of
Inyo,9 the Court said a seizure occurs "only when there is a governmental termination of freedom
of movement through means intentionally applied"'1  The Court subsequently held that "[a]n
arrest requires either physical force ... or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of
authority."11
B. Objectively Reasonable Force
In Tennessee v. Garner,12 the Court articulated the Fourth Amendment test for the use of
deadly force. A youth was shot to prevent his escape from the scene of a burglary, even though
he did not appear to be armed. 13 The Court held that fleeing felons could not be shot unless they
presented an imminent threat. 14 The Court noted that "[A]pprehension by the use of deadly force
is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment."15 The Court
also noted, however that
[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of
serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally
unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect
threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he
has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious
6 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
7 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
8 Id. at 554.
9 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
10 Id. at 597 (emphasis in original).
11 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (emphasis in original).
12 471 U.S. 1 (1985).13 Id. at 3-4.
14 See id at 11.
5Id. at7.
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physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if,
where feasible, some warning has been given.
16
Subsequently, in Graham v. Connor,17 the Court held that excessive force in the course of
arrest claims are governed by an objective reasonableness standard under the Fourth
Amendment. 18 During an investigative stop, the plaintiff allegedly was tightly handcuffed,
shoved face first against the hood of a car, and thrown head first into a police car.
9
[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or
not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of a free
citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its "reasonableness"
standard ....
Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is "reasonable"
under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of "the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
the countervailing governmental interests" at stake .... [T]he right to make an
arrest or investigatory stop carries with it the right to use some degree of physical
coercion or threat thereof to effect it. Because "[t]he test of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application," however, its proper application requires careful attention to the facts
and circumstances of each particular case including the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers
or others, and whether he or she is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.
The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision
of hindsight .... "Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary
in the peace of a judge's chambers," violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus
of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are
often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.
20
C. Qualified Immunity
Officers whose conduct violates the objective reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment may nevertheless be relieved from personal liability under the doctrine of qualified
immunity. Under the classic statement of the defense, "government officials performing
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
161d. at 11-12.
17 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
18 Id. at 392.
19 Id. at 389.
201d. at 395-97 (citations omitted).
Winter/Spring 2005
Richmond Journal ofLaw and the Public Interest
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known."
21
In Malley v. Briggs,22 a state police officer whose request for warrants allegedly caused
unconstitutional arrests was granted qualified immunity. The defense was held to protect
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law ...
Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no
reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue;
but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity
should be recognized.23
Anderson v. Creighton24 involved the warrantless search of the plaintiffs' home for a
bank robber. The Court stated
that it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably
but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that
in such cases those officials-like other officials who act in ways they reasonably
believe to be lawful-should not be held personally liable.
25
The pertinent question is not whether the officer should have believed his or her conduct to be
lawful, but whether the officer could have believed it to be.26 "The relevant question in this case,
for example, is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could
have believed [the defendant's] warrantless search to be lawful, in the light of clearly established
law and the information the searching officers possessed. 27 The dissent in Anderson criticized
the Court for fashioning this "double standard" for Fourth Amendment analysis, one for merits
consideration and the other for qualified immunity.28 In sum, in the Fourth Amendment areas
that the Supreme Court has previously addressed, the Court indicated that, notwithstanding a
constitutional violation, an individual police officer could be entitled to qualified immunity.
29
Saucier v. Katz30 specifically extended the qualified immunity defense to Fourth
Amendment cases where the officer used objectively excessive force. The plaintiff was an
animal rights protester who attended the Vice President's speech.31 As the Vice President began
21 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (involving a Bivens action following Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowing an action for damages as a remedy for a constitutional violation
committed by federal agents)).
22 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
23 Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
24 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (allowing for a Bivens action).
251 Id. at 641.
26 id.
27 Id. at 641 (emphasis added); see also Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) ("Secret Service Agents... are
entitled to immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest [plaintiff]")
(emphasis added).28 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 659 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 638.
30 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
3lId. at 197.
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speaking, the protester unfolded a banner he had concealed under his jacket, walked toward a
fence that separated the public seating area from the speaker's platform, and began to put the
banner on the other side of the fence.32 Military police officers intercepted the protester, grabbed
him from behind, took the banner, and with one officer on each arm half-walked, half-dragged
him out of the area.33 He claimed the officers then shoved or threw him inside a military van,
where he fell to the floor.34 He was uninjured.35
The Court found the defendant military police officer was entitled to qualified
immunity.36 The Court harmonized Graham v. Connor37 (which established the general rule that
excessive force violates the objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment) with
Anderson v. Creighton38 (which required that the right be clearly established with enough factual
specificity for a reasonable officer to know whether his conduct violated that right).39 The
question of whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity is distinct from whether he used
unreasonable force. 40 The Court therefore described two separate inquiries. First, "[t]aken in the
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury [i.e., the plaintiff], do the facts alleged show
the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?"4 1 If on the plaintiffs facts there was no
constitutional violation, the inquiry stops, and the defendant is entitled to judgment.42
On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the
parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was
clearly established. This inquiry ... must be undertaken in light of the specific
context of the case, not as a broad general proposition....
... The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly
established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct
was unlawful in the situation he confronted....
... If the law did not put the officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly
unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is appropriate. 43
The Court first assumed that the protester's factual allegations would have established a
violation of the general rule against excessive force, but then proceeded to the second level of
inquiry: whether this prohibition was clearly established in the particular circumstances the
officer faced.44 A reasonable police officer could have believed that the protester posed a threat
to the safety and security of the Vice President, and that it was necessary to hurry him away from
121d. at 197-98.
33Id. at 198.34 id.
35 id.
36 1d. at 209.
37 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
38 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
39 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02.
401d. at 204.
411d. at 201.
42 id.
431d. at 201-02.
44 1d. at 207-08.
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the scene. 45 Not every push or shove violates the Fourth Amendment, no known case prohibited
the officer's conduct, and the protester was not injured.46 On these facts, therefore, the military
police officer was entitled to qualified immunity.
47
The Supreme Court cases suggest the analytical framework. First, the Fourth Amendment
must be implicated. Was there a seizure subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment? 48 If
there was no seizure, the Fourth Amendment is not at issue.4 9 Next, was the seizure objectively
reasonable and, therefore, consistent with the Fourth Amendment? 50 If there was no Fourth
Amendment violation, the next step of review, qualified immunity, does not have to be
reached.51 Third, if there was an underlying Fourth Amendment violation, are the individual
police officers/defendants entitled to qualified immunity? This hinges on whether, under the
specific circumstances the defendant officers confronted and the information they possessed,
they could reasonably have believed the shooting did not violate clearly established Fourth
Amendment law.52 Many reported cases involve early disposition on a motion for summary
judgment on the basis of the undisputed material facts or, if material facts are disputed, accepting
the plaintiffs version for the purposes of the motion. Even if qualified immunity is denied on
summary judgment, however, it can be preserved as an issue for trial.
II. NOT SEIZURES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
To trigger Fourth Amendment protection, there must be a "seizure." 53 If there is no
seizure, the question of whether it was reasonable is obviously not reached. For a seizure to
occur, "there [must be] a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means
intentionally applied. ,54 Attempted, but failed, seizures are beyond the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.55 In at least three situations, there is no seizure; hence no reason to analyze them
for Fourth Amendment reasonableness: (1) when the officer shoots and misses his intended
target;56 (2) when the officer does not intend to shoot, but his weapon discharges accidentally; 57
and (3) when he/she shoots at a subject and hits someone else. 58 In all of those situations, but
most particularly the latter, substantive Due Process may be implicated, but only if the officer's
conduct is "conscience shocking."
59
45 1d. at 208.
461d at 208-09.
47 1d at 209.
48 Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
49 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553.
50 Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-8.
51 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
52 Id. at 202.
53 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989).54 Id. at 597 (emphasis in original).
55 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998).
56 Cameron v. City of Pontiac, 813 F.2d 782, 785 (6th Cir. 1987).
57 See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596.
58 Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir. 1990).
59 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847.
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In a high-speed pursuit case, County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 60 the decedent was a
passenger on a motorcycle that tipped over and was struck by a deputy sheriff.61 The Court noted
that the "deliberate or reckless indifference" Due Process standard was appropriate to situations
allowing for deliberation, but that where decisions had to be made "in haste, under pressure, and
frequently without the luxury of a second chance," 62 only an intent to harm unrelated to the
legitimate object of arrest would satisfy the "shocks the conscience" standard.63 There is a strong
argument that the intent to harm standard applies to police shootings that are not governed by the
reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment.
Although the Fourth Amendment protects free citizens, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment64 and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment 65 respectively protect pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners. Those plaintiffs
have a higher burden than showing that the shooting was unreasonable; they must prove it was
"conscience shocking," or malicious and sadistic, and for the purpose of inflicting harm and
punishing and not preventing escape.
1. Shooting, Missing
If an officer shoots, but misses his intended target or otherwise fails to stop the subject's
freedom of movement and effect his/her custody, there has been no seizure.66 Accordingly, the
court need not reach the question of whether the seizure was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 67 For example, the officer's firing at an automobile to stop the suspect did not hit
68him or impair his ability to leave the scene. Because there was no seizure, it was unnecessary todiscuss the reasonableness of the officer's conduct under the Fourth Amendment. 69
A woman commandeered a helicopter to land at a state penitentiary to aid the escape of
several inmates.70 After landing in a park, an inmate held a gun to the pilot's head and ordered
him to take off, while a U.S. Customs Service Officer fired shots from the ground.71 Another
Customs Service officer flew the agency's helicopter dangerously near the hijacked helicopter,
trying to force it to land.72 The hostage sued.73 The Tenth Circuit ruled that, while the shots
constituted a show of authority, they did not cause the helicopter to submit. 74 The pilot's
complaint failed to state a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim.
75
60 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
611d. at 844.
62 Id. at 853 (internal citations omitted).
63 Id. at 836.
64 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
65 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
66 Cameron, 813 F.2d at 785.
67 id.
68 Adams v. City of Auburn Hills, 336 F.3d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 2003).
69 id.
70 Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1253 (10th Cir. 1994).
71 id.
72 id.
73 id.
74 1d. at 1256.
75 id.
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Where there is no seizure, substantive due process may provide protection.76 Suspects
threw rocks at police hiding in bushes to do surveillance of a house where they thought drugs
were sold.77 After believing that they heard the chambering of rounds and that they saw a suspect
pointing a gun at one of the officers, the police fired.78 A suspect who was hit was "seized. 79
But where a suspect is fired on in the officer's self-defense but not hit, the conduct is not
"conscience shocking" under the Due Process Clause.80
2. Shooting Accidentally
An accidental or negligent discharge of a firearm is not a Fourth Amendment violation.
81
There is no seizure when an officer lacks the intent to "seize" the subject by firing his/her gun.82
An accidental or negligent discharge of the firearm may occur when an officer tries to do two
things at once, such as grab a suspect with one hand while holding a firearm with the other.
Instead of the Fourth Amendment, the courts may look to the Fourteenth Amendment as a source
of protection, finding a Due Process Clause violation only if the shooting "shocks the
,,83
conscience.
In a district court case, a township police detective fatally shot an arrestee in the back
when a shotgun that he was carrying accidentally discharged. 84 The arrestee had ignored orders
to get down on the floor.85 The detective took his left hand from the shotgun to stop the arrestee
from getting up; when the arrestee's back hit the muzzle, the gun discharged accidentally. 86 The
court held that there was no seizure, and, therefore, no Fourth Amendment violation, because the
officer lacked the intent to seize the decedent by firing the gun.87 Approaching the arrestee to
within arm's length to secure him and prevent him from becoming a danger to the officers was
not objectively unreasonable. 88 Moreover, the shooting did not "shock the conscience" in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
8 9
In another district court decision, 90 an intoxicated car thief was ordered out of a car at
gunpoint and told to lie on the ground.91 With his pistol drawn, the officer searched the car thief,
placed him in handcuffs, and attempted to re-holster his pistol, when it fired and hit the car thief
76 Carr. v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1270-71 (1lth Cir. 2003).
77 1d. at 1263.
78 1d. at 1263-64.
79 1d. at 1268.
80 Id. at 1273.
81 Clark v. Buchko, 936 F. Supp. 212 (D. N.J. 1996).82 1d. at 219-20.
83 Id. at 220.84 1d. at 216.
85 id.
86 id.
87Id. at 219.
88 Id. at 220.
89 1d. at 220-21.
90 Troublefield v. City of Harrisburg, 789 F. Supp. 160 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
9 11d. at 162.
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in the leg.92 The case was dismissed: the accidental discharge was not a "seizure" because it was
not intended to bring the car thief under the officer's control.93
3. Shooting Unintended Bystander
Hostages, passengers, bystanders, and other unintended victims of police officers' shots
are not protected under the Fourth Amendment, since they are not the objects of the attempted
seizure. 94 They are protected under the higher standard of the Due Process Clause. While some
cases discuss the state of mind requirement as "deliberate or reckless indifference," after County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 95 it is likely that the plaintiff would have to demonstrate arbitrary state
action and the more culpable state of mind of "malicious and sadistic intent" to harm the victim
to establish "conscience shocking" conduct.96 Illustrative circuit cases follow.
A robber took the plaintiff, the night manager of a fast-food restaurant, hostage. 97 The
robber tried to drive away with the plaintiff on his lap. 98 Officers fired at the robber but hit the
hostage. 99 Because the officers were not trying to restrain the liberty of the hostage, the Fourth
Amendment was not implicated. 100 Nor did the officers violate substantive due process, since
they did not act with reckless or callous indifference to the hostage's rights; at most, their
conduct was negligent, which was insufficient to prove a constitutional violation.
1 1
A suspect boarded a school van and took the driver and two teenagers hostage. 10 2 A
trooper shot, killing the suspect. 10 3 One of the bullets also passed through a rear seat, deflected,
and then passed through a front seat, hitting one of the hostages. 10 4 The Second Circuit
concluded that the hostage was not seized, so the Fourth Amendment claim failed. 10 5 The
trooper's deliberate decision to stop the suspect's flight was not a willful detention of the
hostage. 10 6 The trooper did not violate the hostage's Fourteenth Amendment rights. 10 7 The
trooper's actions, in a tense situation, did not "shock the conscience." 10 8
Officers shot at a stolen car suspect, but instead killed a bystander motorist who had been
warned to leave the scene. 109 The ruling was for the defendants: the bystander was not the
92 id.
93 Id. at 166.
94 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998) (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-
97 (1989)).
95 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
96 1d. at 852-54.
97 Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 791-92 (1st Cir. 1990).
98 Id. at 792.
99 Id.
1oo Id. at 796.
101 Id. at 796-97.
102 Medeiros v. O'Connell, 150 F.3d 164, 166 (2d Cir. 1998).
103 Id. at 167.
104 id.
105 Id at 168.
106 Id. at 169.
107 Id. at 170.
108 Id. at 170.
109 Rucker v. Harford County, Md., 946 F.2d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 1991).
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intended object of the shooting, and so was not subject to Fourth Amendment protection for
"unreasonable seizures." 110 The substantive provisions of the Due Process Clause could provide
protection, but only where the officer's actions were a "brutal and inhumane abuse of official
power literally shocking to the conscience."I
111
Undercover officers engaged in a firefight with a man with a shotgun, hitting an unknown
passenger in the car.1 12 The unreasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment applies only to
individuals the police are trying to seize. 113 If the police injure an individual they are not trying
to seize, such as the passenger, their conduct violates constitutional rights only if it is malicious,
sadistic, and for the purpose of causing harm.114 The passenger was injured only accidentally." 5
Likewise, the subject of a motor vehicle pursuit lost control and hit a guardrail.' 16 As a
deputy approached with his weapon drawn, the subject accelerated, requiring the deputy to leap
out of the way. 1 7 The subject drove toward the deputy's car.118 The deputy fired at the subject
and at the car's tires, striking a passenger he was unaware of in the car.119 The Sixth Circuit
found the deputy justifiably fired at the car to seize the driver, and did not violate the passenger's
Fourth Amendment rights, since he was unaware of her presence. 
120
On the other hand, a few cases treat the vehicle as the subject of the seizure, rather than
just the people in it. In that way, the unintended shooting of a passenger may be reviewed under
the Fourth Amendment. Intending to disable a stolen truck, a deputy fired and a bullet punctured
the spine of a passenger, instantly paralyzing him.121 The Eleventh Circuit decided that although
the passenger was "seized" because he was hit by a bullet meant to stop him and the driver,
122
the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim.
123
The officer's bullet went through the window and hit the passenger. 124 The Sixth Circuit
denied qualified immunity. 125 When the officer fired at the driver, he intended to stop the car,
seizing everything inside including the passenger. 126 A jury determined that the seizure was
unreasonable.
110Id. at 281.
111 Id. (quoting Temkin v. Fredrick County Comm'rs, 945 F. 2d 716, 720 (4th Cir. 1991).
112 Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350, 354-55 (6th Cir. 2000).
11' Id. at 359.
114 id.
115 Id. at 360-61.
116 Scott V. Clay County, Tenn., 205 F.3d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 2000).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 872-73.
120 Id. at 878.
121 Vaughan v. Cox, 264 F.3d 1027, 1032 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
122 Id. at 1033.
123 Id. at 1037.
124 Fisher v. City of Memphis, 234 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2000).
125 Id. at 317.
126 Id. at 319-20.
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4. Shooting Escaping Prisoner
The reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment does not afford protection to
pretrial detainees, who are protected by the Due Process Clause, or convicted prisoners, who are
protected by the Eight Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.
Accordingly, the plaintiff must show that the shooting was conscience shocking or malicious and
sadistic.
The decedent was arrested for auto theft and there were outstanding warrants on other
charges. 127 After transport to the county jail, he fled from sheriff s deputies. 128 They shouted for
him to stop, and, when he did not, they fired twelve shots. 129 Sheriffs department policy was in
accord with a state statute that authorized deadly force to prevent escape from jail, irrespective of
whether the prisoner was dangerous. 130 The Fifth Circuit held the decedent was a pretrial
detainee. Once an arrestee has been placed into police custody and transferred to a jail cell, he
becomes a pretrial detainee. 132 As such, the Due Process Clause protected him against excessive
force. 133 The prevention of escape was not unconstitutional. 134 "The deputies did not act
maliciously or sadistically or in an attempt to inflict punishment, but rather followed a
constitutional policy that permits deadly force only when necessary to prevent an immediate
escape."' 35
A prisoner escaped while working a farm detail. 136 He was located at a friend's house and
shot in the back while trying to escape. 137 Only the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel
and unusual punishments protects convicts. 138 The Sixth Circuit ruled that the officer did not fire
at the escaped convict maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of inflicting harm, but to
prevent his escape. 139 It granted qualified immunity. 140 A state regulation that authorized
corrections officers to use deadly force only when it was the "least force necessary" 141 to
recapture an escaped prisoner did not create a right under which the plaintiff could sue.
142
Instead, it merely provided a guideline for corrections officers. 143
127 Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1994).
128 id.
129 id.
13 0 
id.
131 Id. at 457.
132 id.
133 Id.
134Id. at 454.
135 Id. at 457.
136 Gravely v. Madden, 142 F.3d 345, 347 (6th Cir. 1998).
13 7 
id.
138 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
139 Gravely, 142 F.3d at 349.
140d. at 346.
141 OFHo ADMIN. CODE §5120-9-01(F)(5)(1984); see also Gravely, 142 F.3d at 349 (citing §5120-9-O1(F)(5).
142 Gravely, 142 F.3d at 349.
14 3 Id. at 349.
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III. RECURRING FOURTH AMENDMENT SITUATIONS
The most common fact patterns involving police shootings are:
(1) The subject is armed with a gun that he refuses to put down.
(2) The subject is a mentally disturbed person armed with knives who is about to
attack.
(3) The subject is using a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon to drag or run the
officer down.
(4) The subject is reaching for something and the surrounding facts and
circumstances lead the officer to believe it is a weapon.
(5) The subject engages the officer in a violent struggle that threatens him/her
with death or serious bodily harm.
(6) The subject is fleeing and has committed a crime involving the infliction or
threatened infliction of serious bodily harm.
1. Subject Armed with Gun
For a shooting to be justified under the objective reasonableness test of the Fourth
Amendment, a subject need not have actually shot or aimed a gun at police. Cases have ruled the
shooting in compliance with the rigors of the Fourth Amendment when the subject was facing
away, had a firearm within reach, or was pointing it at himself/herself and threatening suicide.
The core issue is the imminence of the threat of serious bodily harm or death. In assessing an
officer's entitlement to qualified immunity, the information the officer possessed at the time and
the reasonableness of his/her perceptions are significant. Although it may later be disclosed that
the "gun" is a toy or is unloaded, or officers mistook the identify of the person they shot, that is
irrelevant to the calculus, so long as the officer's perception of an imminent threat to
himself/herself was reasonable.
The following decisions are favorable to the defendants. In the Fourth Circuit,144 police
were investigating a suspected burglary, but the "burglar" was a resident who had been locked
out of the house after a fight with his wife, broke a rear window to get in, and then went to bed,
intoxicated. 145 While an officer was ordering him to get his hands up, the resident brought a rifle
up from under the covers, pointed it at the officer, and yelled.146 Both officers then drew their
weapons and fired. 147 The court affirmed summary judgment for them. 148
Two officers observed a man holding a gun and running toward them. 14 9 He matched the
description of a perpetrator who had shot his gun off and threatened three people at gunpoint.
150
The officers exited their marked patrol car, with weapons (including a shotgun) displayed. 151
144 Cox v. County of Prince William, 249 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2001).
145 Id. at 297.
146 Id. at 298.
147 id.
14 81 d. at 301.
149 Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 2000).
15 0 Id. at 597.
151 Id. at 598.
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They identified themselves and ordered the perpetrator to stop and drop his gun.1 2 He did not. i"3
Instead, he aimed his weapon at them. 154 They pursued on foot, with one officer firing his pistol
three or four times. 155 When the perpetrator turned and aimed again, the officer with the shotgun
fired once, knocking him down. 156 The perpetrator pushed himself up and aimed at the officers
again, at which point the first officer fired seven more rounds, killing him.157 The Sixth Circuit
held that the officers shot in self-defense; hence, they were entitled to qualified immunity.
158
Officers observed a man fitting the description of a bank robber and decided to question
him. 159 They identified themselves and ordered him to stop, but the robbery suspect pointed a
gun at one of the officers, who "ducked behind his car door."'160 The second officer fired two
shots, hitting the robbery suspect, who then fell to the ground. 161 When the officer identified
himself a second time, the robbery suspect allegedly aimed his gun at him. 162 The officer fired
two more shots, which killed the robbery suspect. 163 Affirming summary judgment for the
defendants, the Seventh Circuit said it was irrelevant whether the suspect had actually robbed the
bank. 16 4 The issue the court found determinative was whether the shooting was justified. 165 The
court rejected plaintiff estate's argument that the second set of shots was excessive; the estate
failed to establish that the first shots incapacitated him or that he did not point his gun at the
officer after the first shots.'
66
Similarly, officers responding to a report of a fight encountered an injured young woman
who informed them that two males who had assaulted her had fled to a top floor apartment.
167
The officers announced their presence, but covered the peephole for their safety.' 68 The door
opened and when police saw a man holding a long rifle, the officer standing nearest him fired
four times. 169 The Eighth Circuit decided: "[N]o constitutional or statutory right exists that would
prohibit a police officer from using deadly force when faced with an apparently loaded weapon,"
and the officers could reasonably believe that the subject posed a significant threat of death or
serious physical injury to them or others. 170
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 id.
155 Id. at 601.
156 id.
157 id.
158 Id. at 604.
159 Muhammed v. City of Chicago, 316 F.3d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 2002).
160 id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164d. at 683.
165 Id.
16 6 Id.
167 Sinclair v. City of Des Moines, 268 F.3d 594, 595 (8th Cir. 2001).
168 Id.
169 Id. at 596.
170 id.
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A storeowner carrying cash and his brother carrying a gun left a store via the rear door.'
7 1
A police officer at the wrong address mistook them for robbers. 72 When the police officer
ordered the brother to drop the gun, he shot the officer, sparking a gun battle in which the brother
was fatally shot.' 73 The Ninth Circuit upheld a verdict for the officer.
174
Calls reported fights and gunfire outside of a bar.' 75 Police officers responded, heard a
gunshot, and observed a man running towards them with a sawed-off shotgun. 76 He claimed he
had just taken the gun "from the guy.' 177 Two officers ordered him to drop the gun, but he did
not comply, and ran past the officers. 78 One officer fired two shots, one of which struck the
man in the buttock. 179 The Eleventh Circuit granted qualified immunity:
At least where orders to drop the weapon have gone unheeded, an officer is not
required to wait until an armed and dangerous felon has drawn a bead on the
officer or others before using deadly force .... In view of all of the facts, we
cannot say that an officer in those volatile circumstances could not reasonably
have believed that [the subject] might wheel around and fire his shotgun again, or
might take cover behind a parked automobile or the side of a building and shoot at
the officers or others.
180
In another Eleventh Circuit case, 181 police responded to a call regarding an emotionally
troubled woman. During their initial approach, the woman suddenly opened the door and,
swinging a knife, lunged at the two officers, forcing them to leave the porch.' 82 After she
retreated to a bedroom, police entered the residence. 183 She fired a handgun at four officers, and
three returned fire, killing her. 184 The court held the shooting was not objectively unreasonable or
offensive to the Fourth Amendment. 185 The district court decisions cited in the footnote are also
favorable to the defendants. 
186
171 Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999).
172 Id
171 Id. at 1154.
174Id. at 1158.
175 Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 182 (11th Cir. 1997).17 6 
id.
17 7 
id.
17 8 Id. at 183.
17 9 id
180Id at 185.
181 Menuel v. City of Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
182 Id. at 992.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 993.
185 Id at 997.
186 For district court decisions favorable to the defendants, see the following cases:
Cunningham v. Hamilton, 259 F. Supp. 2d 457 (E.D. Va. 2003). Officers responding to reports of shots in
a high-crime area encountered a subject who did not obey an order to drop his handgun. Whether or not the subject
was pointing the weapon at the officers when he was shot, they were entitled to qualified immunity on summary
judgment. Id.
Leong v. City of Detroit, 151 F. Supp. 2d 858 (E.D. Mich. 2001). A suspect allegedly pointed a shotgun
out of his truck window and fired two shots toward a car that two young women occupied. Unaware of the incident
that had just occurred, two police officers observed the suspect squeal his tires and turn the corner at an intersection
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In contrast, the following decisions are favorable to the plaintiffs. Police were in a
standoff in a field with an apparently suicidal individual, who was pointing the barrel of a single
shot shotgun at his head. 187 He allegedly became agitated and began moving toward the officers,
but stopped about four seconds before being fatally shot.188 Applying Saucier v. Katz,189 the
at a high rate of speed. A chase ensued down several streets and alleys. When blocked in, the suspect fired his
shotgun into the roof of his truck and exited his vehicle carrying the weapon. The district court ruled that the police
officers were entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing the suspect following the chase, regardless of
whether he was shot from the side or from the back. "Under the particular circumstances presented here, this Court
does not share [p]laintiff s view as to the significance of the question whether [the suspect] was facing the officers
or had turned away at the moment he was shot. Initially, the Court notes that none of the cases cited by [p]laintiff
establishes such a bright-line rule .... These cases, then, merely affirm the principle that a police officer's use of
deadly force must rest upon a reasonable belief that [the suspect] posed a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others. None of these decisions establishes the further proposition that a suspect,
though armed, poses no such threat so long as he is facing away from the officer." Id. at 864-65 (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
Natal v. City of New Bedford, 37 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D. Mass. 1999). An undercover officer purchased beer
from a man inside an apartment through a chained, partially open door. At that point, he identified himself as a
police officer and ordered the man to open up. A second officer saw through the space in the door that the man was
holding a shotgun. The first officer told the man to drop the gun, kicked the door in, drew his gun, and, not sure
where the man was pointing the shotgun, shot him in the stomach as he turned away. Less than a minute elapsed.
Under the undisputed facts, it was objectively reasonable for the officer to shoot. A report of one of the plaintiff's
experts suggesting that the officer could have taken cover did not create a fact dispute that would allow the fact
finder to second-guess the officer's decision. Another plaintiff's expert reported that the man was turning away
when shot, but that meant he must have faced the officers beforehand. Id.
Chandie v. Whelan, 21 F. Supp. 2d 170 (E.D. N.Y. 1998). Two armed robbers took an off duty, out-of-
uniform police officer working as security in a convenience store and three store employees hostage. The officer
pulled his pistol from a shoulder holster under his shirt and killed both robbers. The fact that he used hollow point
bullets did not alter the reasonableness of the shooting. Id.
Frane v. Kijowski, 992 F. Supp. 985 (N. D. Ill. 1998). Officers looked through a kitchen window, and saw
the intruder-husband pointing what looked like a gun at his wife's head. The court concluded that a reasonable
officer was justified in thinking that the wife's life was in danger, and therefore shooting, even though the intruder-
husband was actually holding only a dart or BB gun. Id. at 991.
Costoso v. United States, 884 F. Supp. 52 (D. Puerto Rico 1995). Two FBI agents saw a man rob two taxi
cab passengers at gunpoint and run off with a purse. The agents confronted the robber and identified themselves as
law enforcement officers. He responded by turning on them with what appeared to be a semi-automatic pistol, at
which time an agent shot and the robber fell. The pistol was a plastic gun replica. Even if the autopsy report showed
the robber was shot in the back, the bullet's entrance would not determine whether deadly force was unreasonable.
The shooting was consistent with Fourth Amendment guarantees. Id.
Malignaggi v. County of Gloucester, 855 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1994). Two women were taken hostage in a
restaurant. When the SWAT team confronted the hostage-taker, he pointed a rifle at them, and they shot. The rifle
was unloaded. Although plaintiff s expert contended sending in the SWAT team was premature, the court ruled that
"no objectively reasonable police officer would believe that such decision would violate the hostage-taker's civil
rights.... Indeed, [the hostage-taker] was not shot until he pointed his rifle at police." Id. at 80.
Linder v. Richmond County, Ga., 844 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Ga. 1994). A woman called police, saying a
prowler entered the garage, setting off an alarm. Her 88-year-old husband, who was hard of hearing, went out to the
backyard with a loaded pistol. When a deputy sheriff arrived, he came upon the husband and, thinking he was the
prowler, told him to drop the gun. The husband allegedly turned toward the deputy sheriff and fired. The deputy
fired back, with one bullet taking effect on the husband and the other going through the garage and striking the
prowler. Even if the husband shot first and then turned toward the deputy, the deputy was entitled to summary
judgment. Id.
187 Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 136 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001).
188 Id. at 135, n.6.
189 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
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Third Circuit considered whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
showed a constitutional violation. Here they did: if the individual "had stopped advancing and
did not pose a threat to anyone but himself, the force used against him, i.e., deadly force, was
objectively excessive." 190 The plaintiff having adduced evidence of a constitutional violation, the
court next considered whether the constitutional right was clearly established, "[t]hat is, in the
factual scenario established by the plaintiff, would a reasonable officer have understood that his
actions were prohibited?"' 9' The court remanded the case to the district court for application of
the test.'
92
A woman called police for help with her 58-year-old husband, who suffered from
dementia, depression, and physical problems. 193 He was disabled with pepper spray, then shot, as
he supposedly charged or stomped toward an officer. 194 Applying the two-part test of Saucier v.
Katz, 195 the Fourth Circuit said the plaintiff stated a Fourth Amendment violation for excessive
force: "[V]iewed in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], the evidence is that [the officer]
shot a mentally disabled, confused older man, obviously unarmed, who was stumbling toward
the bathroom in his own house with pepper spray in his eyes, unable to threaten anyone."'
196
Secondly, the law was clearly established:
Well before 1998 [the date of the incident] it was clearly established that a police
officer could not lawfully shoot a citizen perceived to be unarmed and
nondangerous, neither suspected of any crime nor fleeing a crime scene. The
decision to use deadly force in these circumstances simply does not lie near the
hazy border between excessive and acceptable force, and any mistaken belief to
the contrary would not have been reasonable.
197
Accordingly, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity before trial.
198
Likewise, a police officer pursued two occupants of a car into a swamp after they exited
the vehicle following a high-speed chase. 199 The officer shot one of the subjects in the back,
paralyzing him.200 The officer asserted that he saw the subject wielding a small pistol, but the
subject claimed that he was unarmed and stuck in the mud when he was shot.20 1 No gun was
recovered.20 2  The jury found that the officer had violated the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment
rights through excessive force, but they also determined that qualified immunity protected him
from liability.20 3 The Supreme Court granted review to determine "whether a jury finding that a
190 Bennett, 274 F.3d at 136.
191 Id
192 Id
193 Clem v. Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543, 545-46 (4th Cir. 2002).
194 Id. at 546.
195 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
196 Clem, 284 F.3d at 552.
197 Id. at 554 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
198 Id.
199 Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 1998).
200 id.
201 Id
202 id
203 Id.
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constitutional violation incurred by use of excessive force in an arrest necessarily precludes a
finding of qualified immunity, so as to make such dual findings irreconcilable [.],, 20 4 However,
the Court later dismissed certiorari (because the case settled). 5 Saucier v. Katz subsequently
resolved the question on which the Court had granted review. 
206
An informant told police where a suspect could be found and claimed that the suspect,
while armed, would not use his weapon on police.20 7 The officer testified that the suspect pointed
a shotgun at him and he fired.20 8 The suspect testified that his gun was in his lap and that he was
lying back on his bed with his arms raised in a "classic surrender position" when the officer
shot.20 9 The physical evidence supported his version, because there was no blood or tissue on the
gun, which was likely if the gun had been in his hands when he was shot.210 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed a jury verdict of $1 million for the suspect.2 11
Finally, a siege occurred after federal marshals came onto Randall Weaver's property in
Ruby Ridge, Idaho.212 Weaver's dog, son and wife were fatally shot, and a family friend was
wounded while retreating to the cabin.213 That individual's lawsuit challenged the "Special Rules
of Engagement" under which federal agents could "kill any armed adult" male "observed near
the Weaver residence, irrespective of whether the armed adult presented an immediate threat of
harm to the agent or to another person., 214 The Ninth Circuit found that "so extreme an order is
patently unjustified,, 215 and confirmed the constitutional standard that "[l]aw enforcement
officers may not shoot to kill unless, at a minimum, the suspect presents an immediate threat to
the officer or others, or is fleeing and his escape will result in a serious threat of injury to
persons., 216 Accordingly, the FBI agent who shot the plaintiff was not entitled to qualified
immunity.
217
2. Subject Armed with Edged Weapon
Many police shootings involve intoxicated, mentally or emotionally disturbed, or suicidal
individuals with knives or other edged weapons. The plaintiff s theory of the case will usually be
that there were less than lethal alternatives: calming the plaintiff down, using an intermediate
weapon like pepper spray, increasing the gap between the subject and the officers, and the like.
On the defense side, generally accepted police procedures allow the officer to shoot if the subject
with an edged weapon closes the reactionary gap, usually described as twenty-one feet or less.
Twenty-one feet (about 7 paces) is the distance a subject with an edged weapon can travel in the
204 Snyder v. Trepagnier, 525 U.S. 1098 (1999).
205 Snyder v. Trepagnier, 526 U.S. 1083 (1999).
206 See 533 U.S. 194, 197 (2001).
207 Robinson v. Nolte, No. 02-55094 (9th Cir. 2003).
208 Id.
209 id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1997).
213 Id.
214 Id at 1200.
215 Id at 1202.
216 Id at 1201.
217 Id. at 1205.
Winter/Spring 2005
Richmond Journal ofLaw and the Public Interest
time period before an officer can draw, aim and shoot his weapon. The justification for the
shooting should be based upon the moment of the shooting and not preceding events.
In the first group of cases, the courts decided in favor of the defendants. In a First Circuit
221
case, officers responded to a call for domestic violence and tried to serve a summons. 28The
intoxicated subject was armed with steak knives.21 9 Officers ordered the subject to drop the
knives.220 They tried to distract him, but he advanced, flailing, kicking and lunging, whereupon
one officer shot.22 1 The First Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.222
Although the shooting may have been avoided, if, for example, the officers had pepper spray, it
did not violate the subject's constitutional rights.223 Police officers are entitled to discretion in
making split-second decisions.224
In a Fourth Circuit case, a woman told the police supervisor that her boyfriend had been
drinking, cut himself, and was destroying things inside the house.225 The supervisor tried to talk
to the boyfriend and calm him down, then attempted to use pepper spray on him and finally
called the emergency response team.226 The boyfriend left the house, holding a chefs knife.227
Officers yelled to drop the knife and stop approaching. 228 He said he wanted to die. 229 When he
was about ten to fifteen feet away, the supervisor shot twice, killing him.2 30 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed judgment for the defense and awarded qualified immunity for the officers: 231
Before the emergency response team could arrive, [the decedent] stepped out of
the house, and, according to all of the police officers, he held a knife in his right
hand. . . . Officers . . . yelled for [the decedent] to drop the knife . . . [The
decedent] continued to walk toward [an officer], holding his knife in a threatening
manner. By this time, [the officers] had drawn their guns. As [the decedent]
continued to approach and was 10 to 15 feet away from [an officer], [the officer]
shot [the decedent] twice in rapid succession, mortally wounding him. [The
officer] states that, at the time of the shooting, he believed that [the decedent]
presented a danger to his life and safety and to the life and safety of others....
... According to the officers, the.., police department trains them in dealing with
persons armed with knives. As [an officer] stated, "We are trained-twenty-one
feet is the closest you let some-one get with an edged weapon because they can
cut you or kill you before you can even fire." This policy is confirmed by a police
218 Roy v. Inhabitants of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691, 693 (1st Cir. 1994).
219 id
220 id
221 Id
222 Id. at 697.
223 Id. at 696.
224 Id. at 695.
225 Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill, 161 F.3d 782, 784 (4th Cir. 1998).
226 Id. at 784-85.
227 id.
228 Id
229 id
230 Id. at 785.
231 Id. at 789.
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expert, who stated that the 21-feet standard "is based on studies which have
shown that an armed individual within twenty-one feet of an officer still has time
to get to the officer and stab and fatally wound the officer even if the officer has
his weapon brandished and is prepared to or has fired a shot."
232
• . . Where an officer is faced with a split-second decision in the context of a
volatile atmosphere about how to restrain a suspect who is dangerous, who has
been recently - and potentially still is - armed, and who is coming towards the
officer despite officers' commands to halt, we conclude that the officer's decision
to fire is not unreasonable.
233
The Fourth Circuit also found no municipal liability:
The only municipal policy that the plaintiffs have identified is the department's
training rule that an officer may use deadly force to stop a threatening individual
armed with an edged weapon when that individual comes within 21 feet. As the
basis for this rule, the department identified studies which have shown that an
assailant with an edged weapon within 21 feet of an armed police officer can kill
the officer before the officer can get off a disabling shot.
• . . [T]he plaintiffs have not produced a shred of evidence that the policy is
unreasonable. They have not called an expert, adduced any testimony, or in any
way contested or brought into dispute the department's reasons for the policy.
Without such evidence, no factual dispute is created.234
In a Fifth Circuit case, 235 officers found the subject of a disturbance call
inside a mobile home with the door open, yelling, cursing, brandishing an
eighteen to twenty inch sword and breaking windows. . . . The officers, with
weapons drawn, told [the subject] to drop the sword .... [The chief of police]
arrived on the scene and attempted to calm [the subject] .... [The chief] told [the
subject] to drop the sword and not to advance on the officers.... During this time
[the subject] was between eight and ten away from the officers. When [the
subject] turned, and raised the sword toward the officers, [the chief] shot [the
subject].... 2 36
Ruling on qualified immunity, the court said, "Although, in retrospect, there may have been
alternative courses of action for [the chief] to take, we will not use 'the 20-20 vision of
hindsight' to judge the reasonableness of [the chief's] use of force .... [The chief's] use of force
against [the subject] was not objectively unreasonable. 237
232 Id. at 785.
2331d. at 788.
214Id. at 788.
235 Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 2003).
23 6 Id. at 622-23.
237 Id. at 625.
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In a Sixth Circuit case, a woman called police to complain that a man with a machete was
chasing her around the residence.238 Police ordered him to drop the machete, but he refused.239
When the man closed the gap to four to six feet with the machete raised, he was fatally shot.
240
The Sixth Circuit affirmed a decision for the defense.241 The use of deadly force was justified
when the decedent ignored warnings and continued to advance with a raised machete.
242
In another case, a schizophrenic got a double-bladed ax and walked toward an officer
with its handle cocked.243 After warning that he would shoot if the plaintiff did not drop the ax,
the officer fired multiple times. 244 The fourth shot, fired from within five feet, disabled the
plaintiff.245 The trial court excluded evidence that the officers created the situation that required
them to use deadly force and they should have responded differently, by waiting for a supervisor,
calling the SWAT team, or using less than lethal force.246 The Eighth Circuit held that the
evidence was properly excluded.247 Evidence that the defendant officer should have done things
differently was irrelevant, the question being whether he acted reasonably.
2 48
In a similar case, a man with a knife had committed an assault and was high on drugs.24
9
The officer chased him on foot, ordering him to freeze.2 50 When the gap closed to three or four
yards, the officer believed he saw the suspect pull a knife from his waistband.2 5 1 Thinking he was
going to attack, the officer slowed down and shot four times, killing him.25 2 Even though the
man may actually not have had the knife in his possession at the time, the officer's belief that the
man was armed and dangerous was reasonable.
253
In a Tenth Circuit case, a motorist "denied that he was intoxicated and refused to submit
to any tests. 254 He punched the officer in the nose and ran a knife across the officer's
stomach. 5 The officer retreated, drew his gun, and, when the man ignored repeated requests to
drop the knife and continued to advance in an attack position, the officer shot.2 56 The Tenth
Circuit held that the fact that the officer failed to handcuff and arrest the drunk driver as required
238 Rhodes v. McDaniel, 945 F.2d 117, 118 (6th Cir. 1991).
239 id.
240 id.
241 Id. at 121.
242Id. at 120.
243 Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 1995).
244 id
245 Id
246Id at 648.
247 id
248 Id. at 649-50.
249 Krueger v. Fuhr, 991 F.2d 435, 436-37 (8th Cir. 1993).
25oId. at 437.
2511id.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 439.
254 Romero v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 60 F.3d 702, 703 (10th Cir. 1995).
255 Id.
256 id
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under state law and procedures was irrelevant.2 5 7 The use of force was objectively reasonable
and the officer was entitled to qualified immunity
2 5 8
In an Eleventh Circuit case, the
Plaintiff obtained a number of objects from the kitchen and threw them at [two
officers]. She threw a glass at [one officer], striking him in the shoulder; and then
she picked up a knife in the kitchen and threw it at [the other officer's] back in an
attempt to kill him. She immediately thereafter raised her hands to her head and,
at that time, was shot four times by each of the [o]fficer [d]efendants. The shots
were fired within a split-second of her assault on [the officer she threw the glass
at] and of her attempt to kill [the officer she struck with the knife], but while she
was unarmed. She was also standing in the doorway to the kitchen where she had
obtained the bottles and knife she had already thrown at the officers.
259
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed its grant of qualified
immunity:
[W]e have considered again whether, in the light of general constitutional rules on
deadly force that had already been identified in the decisional law, this use of
deadly force would have been seen as plainly unlawful by all objectively
reasonable officers; and the answer is "no" given the circumstances, including
that the shooting occurred within a split second of an attempted murder on a
fellow officer.
260
In another Eleventh Circuit case, officers responded to a call involving a drug abuser who
had threatened suicide. 261 He had cut his arms, refused to drop a box cutter he was holding to
his neck, and yelled obscenities. 262 He was sitting on a dresser, but slid off from six to eight feet
from the police, after which an officer shot him in the chest.263 The shooting officers were
entitled to qualified immunity.264 Representative district and state courts have also decided in
favor of officers.265
257Id. at 705.
258 Id at 704-05.
259 Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1301 (quoting Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178, 1185-86 (1 1th
cir. 2001)).
260 Willingham, 321 F.3d at 1304.
261 Wood v. City of Lakeland, Fl., 203 F.3d 1288, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000).
262 Id.
263 Id.
264Id. at 1293.
265 See the following cases for decisions in favor of officers:
Easley v. Kirmsee, 235 F. Supp. 2d 945 (E.D. Wis. 2002). The defendant officers were dispatched to search
for a 6 foot tall, 180 pound 18-year-old, who had left his home in a rage, inebriated, spattered with blood from self-
inflicted cuts, and armed with a knife. As officers closed in on him, he refused to give up the knife, and began to
charge an officer. Fearing for his life, the officer shot and killed the 18-year-old. The officer did not use spray or his
baton or any lesser form of force because of the immediate threat to his life. Given the undisputed facts, the force
was reasonable and the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment. Id. at 965.
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Some cases, however, have been decided against police officers.266 For example, in a
Tenth Circuit case, a teenager told a police officer that the decedent was armed with a knife.
267
The officer came up from behind the decedent, whose hands were in the air.268 The decedent
turned, started to walk toward the officer, and was shot when he approached to about ten feet.
269
The Tenth Circuit held that the use of deadly force was not objectively reasonable. 27 On the
issue of municipal liability, it noted that six encounters involving deadly force in six weeks
showed that such encounters were usual and recurring, and thus required training. 271 The
firearms training was defective, because it had a lecture and movie, but no live "shoot-don't
shoot" on a range.
272
3. Subject Using Motor Vehicle as Weapon
A motor vehicle can be a deadly weapon if driven toward or used to drag an officer.
Plaintiff's usual theory is that the officer's violation of good police procedures in the manner of
his/her approach to the vehicle improperly created the circumstances that then required the use of
lethal force. On the defense side, the Constitution, not police procedures, governs. If the officer
or a civilian was in danger at the time of the shooting, it does not matter what the circumstances
were that got him/her to that point.
The defendants succeeded in representative holdings. In one case an officer leaned into
the car window to speak to the driver, who began to drive away.273 The officer's arm got caught
inside the window, which caused him to be carried 25 to 30 feet before the car swerved and
released his arm.274 A second officer fired at the car, and the bullet struck a passenger in the back
Huong v. City of Port Arthur, 961 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D. Tex. 1997). During two hours, officers and family
members attempted to have a mental subject relinquish a knife and leave. Eventually, when the shooting officer was
backed up against a door with the subject in front of him and the subject drew a bowl of hot grease that he held in
the other hand back as if he were going to throw it, the officer fired one shot. The officer "was in a situation where
he had every reason to believe that he might be hurt or killed by either the knife or the pot of hot grease that [the
subject] held in his hands. Considering the circumstances existing at the exact moment when [the officer] decided to
shoot [the subject] establishes that [the officer's] use of force was objectively reasonable." Id. at 1007.
McRae v. Tena, 914 F. Supp. 363 (D. Ariz. 1996). The plaintiff, who had mental problems, said the officer
could leave, but that he intended to kill the officer by throwing a metal bar at him on the count of three. At the count
of two, the plaintiffs arm was back, and he was ready to throw. Held: The law did not require the officer to retreat
when threatened with the use of force, or to ascertain and choose the least intrusive alternative. Id. at 367.
Yellowback v. City of Sioux Falls, 600 N.W.2d 554 (S.D. 1999). Police located a man sitting in a closet.
He had stabbed his brother and was drunk and holding a knife to his throat. The suspect emerged, still with the knife
at his throat and advanced toward the officers, as they shouted to drop the knife. Discussion: The State Supreme
Court noted that, "[The stabber] had made a sudden aggressive movement, that he had advanced to a point at which
he could easily have lunged and stabbed [the shooter], and that he was moving still closer .... Since the officer acted
reasonably [in shooting], there was no Fourth Amendment violation." Id. at 558-59.
266 See, e.g., case cited infra note 569 and accompanying text.
267 Zuchel v. City and County of Denver, 997 F.2d 730, 735 (10th Cir. 1993).
268 Id. at 736.
269 id.
270 Id. at 737.
271id at 737-38.
2721d. at 738-39.
273 Pittman v. Nelms, 87 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir. 1996).
274 id.
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seat.275 The Fourth Circuit granted qualified immunity on the ground that "an objectively
reasonable police officer certainly could have believed his decision to fire was legally
justified., 276
In another case, an off-duty officer working security responded to a complaint about
reckless driving.277 He observed the plaintiff collide into a parked car and start to drive away.278
He ran toward the car with his revolver drawn, yelling, "Police officer, stop!" 27 9 The car
accelerated, struck him and threw him onto the hood, where he shot into the windshield.280 A
second shot was fired accidentally as the officer fell off the hood.2 81 The Fourth Circuit decided
that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. 282 The "failure of [the officer] to display his
badge when announcing himself as a police officer" and demanding that the driver stop, even if
it was a violation of state law, was "irrelevant to the issue of whether at the moment of the
shooting" the officer had probable cause to shoot.
283
In a Fifth Circuit case, a plainclothes officer patrolling in an unmarked car tried to stop
the decedent on suspicion of drunk driving.284 The decedent stepped on the accelerator and tried
to run the officer over as he approached the vehicle on foot.285 The officer fired once, killing the
driver.286 The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defense holding that the officer
was entitled to qualified immunity.2 87 "[E]ven a negligent departure from established police
procedure does not necessarily signal violation of constitutional protections." 288 The fact that the
city amended its deadly force policy after the incident to prohibit an officer from intentionally or
recklessly placing himself or herself in front of an oncoming vehicle when the use of force is a
likely outcome was not determinative.28 9 The new policy was not constitutionally mandated.290
That the city made the policy more restrictive did not establish that the prior policies were
unconstitutional.29'
In a case decided by the Sixth Circuit, officers shot at the tires of a bank robbery suspect as
he sped away. 292 Another officer, who heard the shots, observed the robbery suspect drive
275 Id.
276
Id. at 120.
277 Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 776 (4th Cir. 1993).
278 Id.
2 7 9 
id
2 80 id.
281 Id
2 82
Id at 780.
283 Id
284 Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1270 (5th Cir. 1992) (quotations omitted).
2 85 Id. at 1271.
286 Id. at 1271-72.
287 Id. at 1276.
288 Id.
2 89 Id. at 1280-81.
290 Id at 1281.
291 Id
292 Dudley v. Eden, 260 F.3d 722, 724 (6th Cir. 2001).
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recklessly. 293 According to him, the suspect rammed his police cruiser, at which point the officer
fired three rounds. 9 The court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation.295 It noted,
[g]iven [the suspect's] bank robbery, his refusal to comply with the commands of
armed policemen, his attempt to evade arrest, and his reckless driving, it was
reasonable for [the officer] to conclude that [the suspect] posed a serious threat to
himself and others.296
In a similar case, the decedent fled at speeds of over ninety miles per hour to evade
capture. In a field and later a dead end street, he crashed into police vehicles and drove around
others.298 As the decedent again attempted to drive off, an officer fired one shot, which killed
him.299 The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, and rejected the
plaintiffs claim that the officer should be liable for violating a city policy that forbids officers to
fire at moving vehicles in order to apprehend a misdemeanor suspect.30 The issue was whether
the officer violated the Constitution, "not whether he should be disciplined by the local police
force. A city can certainly choose to hold its officers to a higher standard than that required by
the Constitution without being subjected to increased liability." '3 '
In another case, the decedent motorist, a suspected drunk driver, led police on a high-
speed chase involving officers from two states. 302 At the end of the chase, the decedent reversed
direction and ran head on into the sheriffs stopped patrol car.3 3 Outside the patrol car, fearing
that the motorist next intended to run him over, the chief of police fired four shotgun blasts,
killing the motorist. 30 4 The Eighth Circuit concluded that even if the shots were fired after the
head-on collision with the sheriffs patrol car, the decedent posed an imminent threat that
justified the shooting and summary judgment for the chief.30 5
293 Id.
294 id.
295 Id at 727.
296 id.
297 Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 344 (6th Cir. 1992).
298 Id.
299 id
300 Id. at 345-46.
301 Id. at 347.
302 Hernandez v. Jarman, 340 F.3d 617, 624 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Ridgeway v. City of Woolwich Township
Police Department, 924 F. Supp. 653 (D. N.J. 1996). The plaintiff sprayed a chemical in a woman's face, robbed her
of her purse, and dragged her through a parking lot before taking off in a car. During the chase, he made a U-turn
and rammed a police vehicle, disabling it. Ten minutes later, a second officer observed the car and gave chase, and
again the plaintiff did a U-turn and rammed the police car. After running a stop sign and entering a parking lot, the
plaintiff rammed the police car again, flipping it on its side. The plaintiff leaned toward the floor before getting out
and appeared to point something at the officer. The evidence was disputed about whether the officer warned him to
stop or he would shoot. The officer fired 10 to 20 rounds at the plaintiff as he ran. The officer reasonably believed
he had to use deadly force to apprehend the plaintiff and to prevent his escape. Id.
303 Hernandez, 340 F.3d at 621.
30
4 id 
.305Id at 624.
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However, the plaintiffs succeeded in other representative circuit holdings. In one case a
plaintiff, after murdering a police officer, fled in a chase.3 °6 The chase ended in a collision. °7 A
state trooper responded to the lookout for a "tall black male. 3 8 When he observed a black male
at the scene dressed in dark clothing and carrying a gun, the trooper mistook a port authority
police officer for the perpetrator and shot him.30 9 According to the port authority officer's
version, the trooper should have observed that the perpetrator was in the car already dead from a
self-inflicted gunshot wound, he (the port authority officer) did not hear the trooper scream to
drop the gun, he did not point the gun at the trooper, and he was mistaken for the perpetrator
because he was also black.310 Applying Saucier v. Katz,311 the Third Circuit found that on the
plaintiffs version of the facts, there was an unreasonable seizure, and a jury on remand would
have to resolve disputed facts before the court could determine whether it would have been clear
to a reasonable officer in the trooper's position that his conduct was unlawful.
312
In a separate case, a shoplifting suspect entered his car and drove in reverse toward an
off-duty officer working security, ignoring her demands to stop. 313 A factual dispute precluded
.31summary judgment on qualified immunity. 314 The decedent's estate argued that the officer was
not standing in the path of the backing car, but along side of it, safely out of the way, when she
fired.315 On the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, "[T]he ultimate question is not
whether [the security officer] really was in danger as a matter of fact, but is instead whether it
was objectively reasonable for her to believe that she was" at the time she fired.316
Another case from the Sixth Circuit involved two women and an officer who saw a
vehicle coming toward them.317 The women jumped on the curb.3 18 The officer fired at the car.319
The bullet went through the window and hit the passenger. 320 The Sixth Circuit denied qualified
immunity.32' When the officer fired at the driver, he intended to stop the car, seizing everything
inside including the passenger.322 A jury considered that the seizure was unreasonable.323
In the Seventh Circuit, an officer ordered the decedent out of the cab that he stole.324
Instead, he locked the doors, rammed the cab into the officer's car, drove recklessly around the
306 Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 273-74 (3d Cir. 2002).
107Id. at 274.
308 Id. at 273-74.
309 Id. at 274.
"0 Id. at 276-77.
311 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
312 Curley, 298 F.3d at 283.
313 Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 283 (3d Cir. 1999).
314 Id. at 282.
315 Id. at 284.
316 Id. at 294.
317 Fisher v. City of Memphis, 234 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2000).
318 Id.
319 id.
320 id.
321 Id. at 317.
322 Id. at 318-19.
323 Id. at 315.
324 Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1993).
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parking lot and tried to escape. 32 5 He sped toward a telephone pole where the officer had taken
cover.326 When the officer stepped out, he and two other officers fired.327 The court held that,
because there was a factual dispute about whether the decedent was intentionally trying to hit the
officer, the case could not be disposed of on summary judgment.328 If, as the plaintiff contended,
the officer unreasonably moved in front of the cab giving the driver no time to stop, then the
decedent did not cause the danger, and the use of deadly force was unjustified.329 If the driver
could see the officer before he accelerated, the shooting was justified.33 °
In another case, an off-duty officer heard a woman scream and saw two young men with
a purse enter a waiting car. 331 The officer fired two shots into the car, killing the driver, who was
not one of two young men he had seen.332 The Ninth Circuit held that the shooter was not
entitled to qualified immunity.333 A "reasonable officer, who had positioned himself facing the
driver so that he was standing closer to the side than the dead center of the car, would have
recognized that he could avoid being injured when the car moved slowly, by simply stepping to
the side ...a reasonable police officer in [the shooter's] position would not have perceived
himself to be in danger of serious bodily harm."
334
In another Ninth Circuit case, a federal customs agent who was undercover approached a
parked car at a pier and observed a subject with his pants down on top of a woman.335 The
woman screamed for help. 336 Before an agent could apply handcuffs, the subject broke free,
jumped back in the car, put it in reverse and raced backwards, with the agent holding on to the
door with one hand and his weapon with the other. 337 The agent claimed he feared for his life and
held onto the car while he fired three shots, at least two of which hit and killed the subject.338
The subject's estate claimed the agent jumped clear of the car after the first shot and was safely
out of harm's way before he fired the second and third.339 The Ninth Circuit held that a disputed
issue of fact concerning the agent's location when he fired and whether he reasonably believed
his life was in danger precluded summary judgment.340
325 Id.
3 2 6 
id.
327 id.
328 Id. at 232-33.
329Id at 233-34.
3 3 0 
id
331 Acosta v. City and County of San Francisco, 83 F.3d 1143, 1144 (9th Cir. 1996).
332 Id
333 Id. at 1148.
334 Id. at 1146-47.
335 Pellegrino v. United States, 73 F.3d 934, 935 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Javid v. Scott, 913 F. Supp. 223, 228
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that the reasonableness of the use of deadly force did not depend upon whether the officer
thought the decedent had a gun, but what he saw the decedent do).336 Pellegrino, 73 F.3d at 935.
337 id
338 Id. at 936.
33 9 id.
340 Id. at 937.
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4. Subject Reaching for Something
Some subjects are shot when they make a furtive gesture, grab for their waistband, reach
for something out of sight, try to gain control of the officer's firearm, or hold an object that the
defendant mistakenly believes could be a deadly weapon. These cases turn on the reasonableness
of the officer's perceptions that the subject presented an immediate threat under the particular
facts and circumstances.
On the defense side, several cases illustrate the standard of a "reasonably perceived
threat." A mall patron said the plaintiff appeared to have a gun under his sweater.341 Noting the
bulge under the plaintiffs clothing near his waistband, officers ordered the plaintiff to raise his
hands and to get down on his knees. 342 The plaintiff initially complied, but later put his hands
down to reach into his pocket to turn off his personal stereo. 343 Believing the plaintiff was
reaching for a weapon, the officer shot.344 The Fourth Circuit decided that the officer was
entitled to qualified immunity, because he reasonably believed the plaintiff was armed with a
gun.34
5
In another case, an undercover officer sold drugs to the driver of the car in which the
plaintiff was a passenger.346 The arresting officer blocked the car, identified himself, and with his
gun drawn ordered the plaintiff to raise his hands.347 The plaintiff had an unidentified object in
his hand.348 Instead of putting up his hands, the plaintiff began to turn his upper body toward the
officer.349 Believing the plaintiff was about to use a weapon, the officer shot him once in the
face. 350 The object turned out to be a beer bottle.351 The Fourth Circuit ruled that the officer was
entitled to qualified immunity.352 He reasonably could have believed the plaintiff presented a
deadly threat.
353
In another Fourth Circuit case, a vice officer saw a woman she thought was a prostitute
enter a vehicle with a man. 354 Believing she observed an illegal sex act occurring, the vice
officer opened the car door, identified herself, and ordered the occupants to place their hands
where she could see them.3 55 The man reached for a long cylindrical object behind the seat.356
341 Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 2001).
342 Id
343 id
344 id
45 Id at 132.
346 Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 215 (4th Cir. 1991).
347 id.
348 Id.
349 id.
350 id.
351 Id.
352Id. at 217.
353 Id. at 216-17.
354 Greenidge v. Ruffim, 927 F.2d 789, 790 (4th Cir. 1991).
355 Id.
356 id.
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Expecting it to be a shotgun, the vice officer shot.357 The item was a wooden nightstick.358 The
jury verdict for the vice officer was affirmed. 9
In the Fifth Circuit, the police spotted a suspected convenience store robbery getaway car
and gave chase. 360 A passenger discarded portions of the cash register as they fled.361 After the
vehicle spun out of control, police drew their weapons and surrounded it.362 In defiance of orders
to raise his hands, a passenger repeatedly reached down below the line of sight.3 63 When the
passenger tipped his shoulder and reached further down, the officer shot.364 The court issued a
ruling granting summary judgment for the defense.365
In a similar case, an off-duty officer observed an intruder attempting to enter
residences. 366 Inside a home, the officer told the intruder to halt and put his hands up.3 6 7 Instead,
the intruder fled, with a purse in one hand and the other out of sight, and jumped over a deck
railing to the ground 15 feet below.368 The officer repeated his warning, but the intruder, from a
crouched position, rotated his shoulder and the officer shot.369 The Eighth Circuit upheld a
verdict for the officer.
370
In another Eighth Circuit case, after a report of shots fired, a robbery suspect climbed
over a short fence, looked over his shoulder at the officer, and moved his arms as though
reaching for a weapon at waist level.371 The suspect's back remained turned toward the officer
and his hands were obscured from view.372 The officer yelled, "stop," and when the suspect
continued to move, he fired into his back.373 The Eighth Circuit granted summary judgment for
the defense, noting that "An officer is not constitutionally required to wait until he sets eyes upon
the weapon before employing deadly force to protect himself against a fleeing suspect who turns
and moves as though to draw a gun."
374
In another case, as numerous officers, including the named defendants, began arriving at
the scene, the plaintiff "refused to leave the house and began using cocaine and drinking rum."
375
The plaintiff told an officer that he had a gun.376 The plaintiff "finally emerged from the house
357 id.
358 Id.
359
Id. at 793.
360 Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 495 (5th Cir. 1991).
361 Id. at 495-96.
362 Id at 496.
363 Id
364 id
365 Id. at 501.
366 Billingsley v. City of Omaha, 277 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 2002).
367 id.
368 Id.
369 id.
370 Id. at 995.
371 Thompson v. Hubbard, 257 F.3d 896, 898 (8th Cir. 2001).
372 Id.
373 id.
374 Id. at 899.
375 Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1126 (10th Cir. 2001).
376 Id. at 1127.
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with his ... hand wrapped in a towel concealing a staple gun, which [the plaintiff] intended as a
representation of a weapon." 377 Although the officers ordered the plaintiff to stop, he continued
to walk toward and into the street.378 The officers used non-lethal beanbag rounds, then an attack
dog, to stop the plaintiff.379 The plaintiff "subsequently dropped to the ground and exposed the
staple gun, which officers ... believed to be a gun."380 As he turned to the left, causing an officer
to conclude he and other officers were in the line of fire, two officers opened fire from distances
between eight to twelve feet.381 The plaintiff survived his injuries.38 a The Tenth Circuit
remanded the case with instructions that the district court enter judgment in favor of the
defendant officers, making three important points: (1) Fourth Amendment scrutiny applies to
conduct that is immediately connected to the seizure; (2) violations of state law and police
procedure do not necessarily violate the Constitution; and (3) officers do not have to choose what
in hindsight was the least intrusive alternative.383 A few district court cases are representative.384
377 Id.
378 Id.
379 Id.
3 80 id.
381 Id
382 id
383 Id at 1132-33.
384 For representative decisions, see the following district court cases:
Medeiros v. Town of Dracut, 21 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. Mass. 1998). Two officers encountered two male
motorists who acted suspiciously. When the first officer attempted to pat the first suspect down for weapons, the
suspect drew a semi-automatic weapon and pointed it in the officer's face. The second officer, believing he saw the
first suspect squeeze or jerk something on the weapon, fired at the suspect. The second suspect then ran and dove
behind the open door of their pickup truck as if to go into the cab for a weapon. The second officer fired at the door
of the pickup, striking the suspect in the arms and leg. He was unarmed. "There are at least two reasonable
explanations for plaintiffs conduct. On the one hand, diving for cover is a perfectly reasonable reaction on the part
of an innocent person caught in a firefight. On the other hand, a culpable individual might dive for a weapon to
prevent capture, or, worse, to take the offensive against the police. Confronted with two possible explanations, and
the need to make a split-second decision that, either way, would have potentially life-threatening consequences." Id.
at 88. The officer was entitled to qualified immunity "unless no reasonable police officer could have believed that
plaintiff posed a threat." Id. at 89.
Ridgeway v. City of Woolwich Twnshp Police Dep't, 924 F. Supp. 653 (D.N.J. 1996). After running a stop
sign and entering a parking lot, the plaintiff rammed the police car, flipping it on its side. The plaintiff leaned toward
the floor before getting out and appeared to point something at the officer. The evidence was disputed about whether
the officer warned him to stop or he would shoot. The officer fired 10 to 20 rounds at the plaintiff as he ran. The
officer reasonably believed he had to use deadly force to apprehend the plaintiff and to prevent his escape.
St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 885 F. Supp. 349 (D.N.H. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 71 F.3d 20 (1st. Cir.
1995). A search warrant execution team came around the plaintiffs car from the rear, shouting "Police." A
plainclothes officer in the lead and on the passenger side observed the plaintiff reach for a gun, at which time the
officer shot. Qualified immunity granted on summary judgment: Although the officers may have created a
dangerous situation by approaching from the rear with guns drawn and a plainclothes officer in the lead, using
deadly force under the circumstances did not violate clearly established law. Id. at 358.
Colon v. Rivera, 846 F. Supp. 156 (D.P.R. 1993). Officers responding to a breaking and entering incident
saw the plaintiff running down the stairs. The defendant officer chased the plaintiff through yards and over a fence.
The plaintiff reached into his pocket, pulled out something shiny, and approached the defendant officer, who fired,
hitting him in the leg. Outcome: The officer was entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 161.
Wyche v. City of Franklinton, 837 F. Supp. 137 (E.D.N.C. 1993). An officer received a call about a
mentally disturbed person. The officer observed a man with blood on his arms roaming the aisles of a convenience
store. The officer called for backup. When the person saw the officer out in the parking lot, he started chasing him,
threatened to kill him, and started to grab him. The officer told him to stop or he would shoot. Nevertheless, he
continued to advance to three to five feet, reached behind his back and lunged forward. The officer shot him in the
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On the plaintiffs' side, some cases illustrate the lack of a reasonable threat. In one case,
the plaintiff robbed a pharmacy and took off running, with a jacket in one hand and a mesh bag
with stolen cash and drugs in the other. 385 When the officer ordered him to stop, the thief turned
and unexpectedly threw the jacket and bag at the officer.386 After the bag hit the officer in the
shoulder, he again ordered the thief to stop and shot him in the back.387 The Seventh Circuit
reversed the trial court's grant of qualified immunity to the officer.388 Throwing the jacket and
bag was not like the threat of a weapon. 389 After the thief threw the bag and jacket and started to
run, there was no immediate threat.
390
In another case, a radio call said a motorist involved in an accident was assaulting a
female passenger. 391 Officers observed a suspect running on a bridge, engaged in a foot pursuit
with their weapons drawn, and chased the suspect into a field.392 He ignored commands to show
his hands, turned, and uttered obscenities, whereupon the officer shot him.393 The Eighth Circuit
said the case against each officer should be analyzed separately. 394 Contradictions in the
testimony, physical evidence, and testimony from a police procedures expert precluded summary
judgment on qualified immunity. 395
Finally, in another Eighth Circuit case, troopers were involved in a high-speed chase.
396
The pursued vehicle hit a chain link fence at the end of a vacant lot and came to a stop. 397 The
troopers surrounded the vehicle.398 The defendant trooper approached the passenger side with his
gun drawn and used his flashlight to break the passenger-side window. 399 The plaintiffs
decedent raised his hands and made eye contact with the defendant trooper.400 The plaintiffs
decedent shifted his eyes to his left, dropped his hands, twisted his body to his left, and reached
to the floor in the area between his legs and the console in the middle of the vehicle. 40 1 The
Eighth Circuit denied summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. 402 A question of fact
existed regarding whether the decedent was turning reflexively down and away from the
leg, the person continued to approach, and the officer then fired a fatal shot. The court granted summary judgment
on qualified immunity: A reasonable officer could have believed the use of deadly force was necessary and lawful.
Id. at 143.
385 Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 245 (7th Cir. 1993).
3 8 6 
id.
3 8 7 
id.
388 Id. at 246-47.
3 89 Id at 247.
390 id
391 Wilson v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 293 F.3d 447, 449 (8th Cir. 2002).
392 Id
393 Id.
394Id. at 454.
395 Id.
396 Ribbey v. Cox, 222 F.3d 1040, 1041 (8th Cir. 2000).
397 Id.
398 Id.
399 id
400 id.
401 Id
402 Id. at 1043.
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breaking window or the trooper had probable cause to believe that the decedent was reaching for
a weapon, and thus posed a significant threat of death or serious physical harm.
40 3
5. Subject Engaged in Violent Struggle
Where a subject engages the officer in a violent struggle that threatens him or her with
death or serious bodily harm, the shooting is ordinarily justified. Cases ruling in the defendant's
favor have some of these features:
(1) Although unarmed, the subject has clearly achieved the upper hand and is
inflicting serious bodily harm;
(2) the officer is in immediate danger of losing consciousness;
(3) the subject is using the officer's baton or other equipment against him; or
(4) the subject is about to gain control of the officer's weapon.
In an illustrative case from the Fifth Circuit, the suspect did not answer questions
truthfully, disobeyed orders to get on the ground, and violently resisted two troopers' attempts to
control him. 404 The suspect, who was larger, knocked a trooper to the ground, where the trooper
was dazed and experienced blurry vision.405 The suspect moved toward the patrol car, which had
the trooper's shotgun. 40 6 The court held that the failure to give a warning before firing was not
objectively unreasonable, as the trooper did not know if the suspect was going to escape or kill or
seriously injure him.407
In another case, the plaintiff left a treatment center for mental illness and chemical
dependency.4 °8 During a struggle to take him into custody, a deputy hit the plaintiff with his
baton.40 9 The plaintiff reached for the deputy's gun, hit him, kicked him in the chest, knocked
him down twice and pushed him onto the floor.4 10 The court held the shooting was justified.4 1 1
The encounter lasted less than three minutes, but rapidly escalated.412 The deputy could
reasonably have believed that his life was in danger.
413
403 Id. See also Javid v. Scott, 913 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The suspect looked at the officer, turned quickly
to his right, and turned back facing the officer. The pick-up came directly towards the officer's vehicle. Believing
that the robbery suspect was reaching for a gun, the officer fired a bullet that broke the driver's side window and
struck the robbery suspect in the side. Dispositive motion denied: Fact issues had to be tried. The reasonableness of
the use of deadly force did not depend upon whether the officer thought the decedent had a gun, but what he saw the
decedent do. Id. at 228.
404 Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 99 (5th Cir. 1997).
405 Id.
406 id.
407 d. at 100.
408 Nelson v. County of Wright, 162 F.3d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 1998).
409 Id. at 988.
410 id.
411 Id. at 991.
412 Id. at 989.
411 Id. at 991.
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In another case, a police detective in an unmarked car with his wife and daughter pursued
a car that almost caused a head-on collision.4 14 The pursued car struck a curb and the detective
walked up to the vehicle with his gun in one hand and a long metal flashlight in the other.415 The
very intoxicated motorist did not respond to the detective's request to put his hands on the
steering wheel and instead tried to escape.416 The detective reached inside to turn off the ignition,
but the motorist grabbed the detective's flashlight.417 When the detective tried to handcuff him,
the motorist came out of the vehicle swinging.4 18 The detective hit the motorist with his
flashlight, the motorist kicked the detective in the stomach and groin, and the two fought for
control of the detective's gun.419 The detective shot, killing him.420 The Ninth Circuit held that
there was no Fourth Amendment violation.
42 1
6. Subject Fleeing
In the final category of common fact patterns, the subject has committed a violent crime
and is fleeing. Under Tennessee v. Garner, lethal force is justified to prevent escape if no
alternative means of apprehension are available. 422
For instance, in one case, a burglar tied up three victims and shot two others with a gun
found in the house, took firearms and ammunition, and fled the scene.423 Officers located him on
foot in the neighborhood.424 After ordering him to surrender, they fired shots as he climbed a
fence. Two shots fired through the fence hit him in the hip and the back.426 The court held that
use of deadly force was justified.427 The burglar had committed a crime involving infliction of
serious bodily harm, was still a threat, was trying to escape, and was warned before the officers
shot.428 Although he might have been captured later by less drastic means, the Fourth
Amendment did not require that.
429
414 Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
415 id.
416Id. at 1181.
417 id.
418 id.
419 id.
420 id
421Id. at 1190-91.
422 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 20 (1985).
42 Forrett v. Richardson, 112 F.3d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Ridgeway v. City of Woolwich Township
Police Dep't, 924 F. Supp. 653 (D.N.J. 1996). After running a stop sign and entering a parking lot, the plaintiff
rammed the police car, flipping it on its side. The plaintiff leaned toward the floor before getting out and appeared to
point something at the officer. The evidence was disputed about whether the officer warned him to stop or he would
shoot. The officer fifed 10 to 20 rounds at the plaintiff as he ran. The officer reasonably believed he had to use
deadly force to apprehend the plaintiff and to prevent his escape. Id. at 655-56.
424 Forrett, 112 F.3d at 418.
425 Id.
426 id
427 Id. at 421.
428 Id
429 id.
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In contrast, in a Sixth Circuit case, a male robbery victim told police that one of the two
robbers had a gun.430 The police then saw the two robbers attempt a second armed robbery
against a woman.431 One of the suspected robbers, a passenger in a car, pointed a gun at an
officer and the officer fired back.432 The driver fled on foot, was shot trying to escape, and died
later.433 The only weapon recovered was the passenger's rifle.434 There was a factual dispute over
whether an objectively reasonable police officer would have thought the driver was armed and an
immediate threat, and, therefore, the Sixth Circuit could not award summary judgment based on
qualified immunity.43
IV. RECURRING FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES
Regardless of the fact pattern, there are recurring issues that stake out the bounds of the
Fourth Amendment. These are discussed in the following sections:
(1) Pointing a gun without shooting may implicate the Fourth Amendment if it
is done in connection with detaining someone or taking them into custody; and it
may be objectively reasonable when the officer's safety and security are
threatened.
(2) Off-duty police officers engaging in purely private disputes and not
performing a core police function like making an arrest are not acting under color
of law, and, therefore, cannot be charged with a Fourth Amendment violation
enforceable through section 1983. However, the analysis becomes more
complicated if their department rules require officers to be "always armed/always
on duty."
(3) Although the Supreme Court has said that a pre-shooting warning should be
given if feasible, it did not define the limits of feasibility. Numerous lower federal
court decisions have found that the threat of harm was so imminent that a warning
was not feasible, and, therefore, not constitutionally required.
(4) The Fourth Amendment does not limit the number of shots that can be fired
if a shooting is justified, but it does require that none be fired after the threat is
eliminated.
(5) At least one court has said that the reasonableness inquiry is limited to the
person who is actually shot. That bystanders may have been at risk does not
render an otherwise reasonable shooting unreasonable.
(6) Compliance with state law and department protocols may bear on the
objective reasonableness of an officer's actions, but ultimately does not determine
whether the actions are in compliance with the Fourth Amendment.
(7) The Fourth Amendment does not require an officer to choose the least
intrusive or the best among alternatives, only one that is objectively reasonable.
430 Washington v. Newsom, 977 F.2d 991, 992 (6th Cir. 1992).431 Id. at 993.
432 Id.
433 Id.
434 Id.435 Id. at 995-96.
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(8) The Supreme Court has yet to determine if a Fourth Amendment
reasonableness review should include the entire sequence of events leading up to
a shooting where the police claim self defense, or just those events immediately
before and the shooting itself. Most lower federal court decisions do not consider
whether the shooting police officer created or could have avoided the
circumstances that later required the use of deadly force, but only whether the
officer's shooting was justified considering only the threat at that instant. With
some courts, the result may be different. They may break the incident up into
segments and scrutinize each one under the reasonableness standard. Or they may
impose liability if a Fourth Amendment violation earlier in the sequence
provoked, i.e., can be causally linked to, the shooting itself.
1. Pointing Gun Without Shooting
Police officers draw their weapons in the normal course of their duties for their own
safety and security, e.g., conducting high-risk motor vehicle stops, investigating robberies and
burglaries in progress, and executing high-risk search and arrest warrants. While this conduct is
gauged by the objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment, it generally does not
violate it. In some instances, e.g., where an officer draws his gun and the subject is not under
detention or the officer is trying to detain him/her and the subject does not respond to the show
of force, there is no seizure, and the issue of whether the use of force was unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment is not ripe. In a few examples, an officer points a weapon at an unarmed
subject who poses no threat to the officer's safety or security. In such cases, it can properly be
said that excessive force was used in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Several examples make the point for the defense. For example, in one case, based on
radio reports, sheriffs deputies suspected that the occupants of a car they stopped had been
involved in the shooting of a security guard or police officer in a tavern parking lot fight.
436
Officer safety justified ordering the occupants out a gunpoint, handcuffing them, and detaining
them in the back of a police vehicle while the deputies investigated the shooting.
437
In another case, police pursued a suspect on foot on suspicion that he stole a van.438 An
officer pointed his gun at the suspect and re-holstered it when the suspect started to run.
439
Pointing the gun did not cause the suspect to submit to authority, and was, therefore, not a
seizure. 440 Moreover, because the officer had reason to believe the suspect committed a felony,
fled, and hid to avoid capture, his conduct was objectively reasonable. 441
In a Ninth Circuit case, police responded to a radio dispatch regarding a man who had
just shot two dogs and was in middle of the street yelling. 442 According to the plaintiff, an
436 Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does, 174 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1999).
43 7 Id. at 815.
438 Edwards v. Giles, 51 F.3d 155, 156 (8th Cir. 1995).
439 id
440 1d. at 157.
44 lid.
442 Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002).
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officer took out his gun and pointed it at him.443 The other officer told the plaintiff to put his
hands over his head.444 As the plaintiff was putting his hands up, the other officer commanded
him to step forward and thrust his gun three or four feet from the plaintiff s head. 445 As a retired
police officer, the plaintiff "was aware of the immediate physical danger posed by a gun pointed
at his head from point blank range; he testified that he feared for his life.446 The court's analysis
was that the retired officer's "earlier use of a weapon, that he clearly no longer carried, is
insufficient to justify the intrusion on [his] personal security." 447 He, therefore, alleged a claim of
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment's standard of "objective
reasonableness. 4 48 However, because the law regarding pointing a gun to the head of an
unarmed suspect during a detention or arrest was not clearly established, the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity.
441
In another case, a police officer allegedly pointed a gun at a family member and made a
"profane remark. 4 50 Because the plaintiff was not arrested or his liberty restrained, there was no
seizure, and, therefore, no unreasonable seizure through excessive force.
451
However, compare those outcomes with a Seventh Circuit decision.452 The complaint
alleged that, during a residential search, a boy posed no threat to the officer's safety.453 He was
not actively resisting arrest, attempting to flee, assaulting anyone, or suspected of committing a
crime.454 Even if there was no "precisely analogous case," it "should have been obvious" to the
officer that the threat of deadly force was objectively unreasonable.455 Qualified immunity was
denied.456
2. Off-Duty Conduct
Many police departments require their officers to carry their firearms at all times and to
take police action when they are off-duty. Off-duty officers put themselves at risk to protect lives
and property. But since no reputable municipality would have a police department with no
uniforms, radios, vehicles, or use of force options between a bare hand and a hand gun, the
"always on duty/always armed" policy puts both officers and the public at risk without
specialized officer guidance and training. For instance, off-duty officers typically are cautioned
against making motor vehicle stops, or taking action where confusion over their identity as
police officers could cause a danger to themselves or others. Instead, the appropriate police
response may be to call for on-duty, uniformed officers.
443 Id.
444 Id.
445 id.
446 id.
447 d. at 1014.
448 Id.
449 d. at 1016.
450 Fuller v. Vines, 36 F.3d 65, 67-68 (9th Cir. 1994).
451 Id at 68.
452 McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1992).
411 Id. at 292-93.
454 id.
455 Id. at 295.
456 id.
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In a significant Tenth Circuit ruling, a motorist running errands became involved in a
traffic dispute with another driver who was a police officer. 457 The police officer "was not on
regular shift, was driving his own car, and was not in uniform." 458 According to the motorist, on
the two occasions when the two cars were stopped, the off-duty officer got out of his car, walked
up to the motorist's car, and drew his service revolver out of his jacket.459 He then shouted that
he was a police officer without displaying a badge or other identification, and pointed the gun at
the motorist's face. 460 The second time the motorist put the car in gear and started to drive
away.461 The off-duty officer fired several shots into the car, hitting the motorist approximately
three times.462 The shooting caused the motorist a collapsed lung, shattered ribs, and extensive
nerve and muscle damage in his neck, chest, and arm.
463
The off-duty officer claimed that, "after the traffic dispute, the motorist brandished a
weapon at him, committing the crime of felony menacing. He therefore attempted to arrest [the
motorist] pursuant to [the city's police department] policy."464 The second time he approached
the motorist's vehicle he ordered the motorist to keep his hands visible.465 Instead, the motorist
reached down to his right, brought his hand up, and began driving away.466 He fired because he
feared the motorist was both reaching for a weapon and attempting to flee.467
After settling with the off-duty officer, the motorist proceeded to trial on the § 1983
municipal liability claim based on a "failure to train" theory. 46 8 Specifically, the motorist claimed
the city and county failed to train its officers adequately with respect to implementing the
following department policies:
Rule and Regulation 107 - Always on Duty
Officers are held to be always on duty, although periodically relieved from their
routine performance of it.... The fact that they may be technically off-duty shall
not relieve them from the responsibility of taking proper police action in any
matter coming to their attention. When there is no urgent or immediate need for
police action, they may request the dispatcher to turn the matter over to officers
on duty in the district, but they shall take such police action as may be required
prior to the arrival of the dispatched officers.
4 69
Rule and Regulation 85 - Equipment Carried on Person
457 Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2000).
458 Id.
459 id.
460 id.
461 Id.
462 Id.
463 Id.
464Id. at 1284.
465 Id.
466 id
467 id
468 Id at 1284-85.
469 Id. at 1285-86.
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Officers shall.., be armed at all times.. 470
These policies were referred to collectively in the opinion as the "always armed/always on duty"
policy.
47 1
With regards to municipal liability, the motorist's failure to train theory was,
police officers were not instructed how to take "police action" when they were
off-shift and without their uniforms, police vehicles, radios, and other
accouterments of law enforcement. He contended that despite the different
circumstances presented when an officer is off-shift, the officer training program
purposefully did not distinguish between on-shift and off-shift scenarios. Officers
were instead told to respond as though they were on-shift in all situations.
Consequently, [the off-duty officer] believed he was required to take police action
after he thought he saw [the motorist] brandish a gun. However, he could not
properly pull [the motorist] over because he was not in his patrol car, failed to
adequately identify himself as a police officer because he was not in uniform, and
inappropriately escalated the violence level of the encounter because he was
unable to call for back-up.472
In support of his theory, the plaintiff called a twenty-nine year veteran of the department and
former commander of the police academy, and an expert witness with an extensive background
in police policies, procedures, and training practices.473 The Tenth Circuit held that there was
sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to training on how to handle off-shift incidents and
a direct causal link to the incident to sustain the verdict against the city.
474
Occasionally, off-duty officers abuse their police powers and equipment in the course of
private disputes. If they are not performing a police function, they are not acting under color of
state law, and § 1983 does not afford a Fourth Amendment remedy. For example, what began as
an argument inside a bar turned into a fatal shooting outside between a patron and an off duty
officer who displayed his police identification and service revolver under an "always
armed/always on duty" policy. 475 The First Circuit held that the fact that the officer agreed to go
outside to settle his differences in a brawl "dominate[d] any characterization of the events." 476
Because he was not acting under color of law, defendants could not be held liable on a
deprivation of civil rights theory. 4
77
In the Ninth Circuit case, an intoxicated, off-duty sheriffs deputy fatally shot a man in a
barroom brawl. 478 The county had an always armed/always on duty policy and another against
470 id.
471 Id. at 1286.
472 id.
471 Id. at 1289.
474 Id. at 1291.
475 Parrilla-Burgos v. Hernandez-Rivera, 108 F.3d 445, 450 (1st Cir. 1997).
4 7 6 
id
47 7 Id at 446.
478 Huffinan v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 1998).
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being drunk and disorderly.479 The decedent's representatives argued that the county was liable
because the sheriffs department failed to warn deputies about the danger of carrying a gun while
intoxicated.480 Evidence was introduced that fifteen of sixty-three off-duty shootings and
seventeen off-duty brandishings of guns involved alcohol.481 There was no municipal liability
because the county could not have foreseen that a deputy would become drunk and disorderly
and shoot someone.
482
3. Feasibility of Warning
Tennessee v. Garner permits deadly force, "if, where feasible, some warning has been
given." 483 Cases discuss whether the officer has issued a warning ("Drop the gun or I'll shoot"),
or an immobilization command ("Police, freeze"); or, in a variation, visually or audibly
identified himself or herself as a police officer.
In a First Circuit case, a police officer obtained a search warrant for the decedent's person
and his business premises.4 84 As a plainclothes detective approached the decedent, who was
sitting in his vehicle, the decedent reached for a firearm.485 Under the plaintiffs version, before
identifying himself or his purpose, the officer fired. 486 The First Circuit awarded qualified
immunity for the detective. The law was not clearly established that he had to announce his
identity and purpose before executing the warrant.
487
In a Fifth Circuit case, the suspect did not answer questions truthfully, disobeyed orders
to get on the ground, and violently resisted two troopers' attempts to control him. 488 The suspect,
who was larger, knocked a trooper to the ground, where the trooper was dazed and experienced
blurry vision.489 The suspect moved toward the patrol car, which had the trooper's shotgun.49 °
The court held the failure to give a warning before firing was not objectively unreasonable. 491
The trooper did not know if the suspect was going to escape or kill or seriously injure him.492
In another case, an officer chased on foot a man reported to have a knife, and ordered him
to freeze. 493 When the gap closed to three or four yards, the officer believed he saw the suspect
479 Id. at 1060.
4 80 Id.
481 Id.
482 id.
483 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985).
484 St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 22 (lst Cir. 1995).
485Id. at 23.486 id.
487 Id. at 28; see also Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 780 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the "failure of [the officer] to
display his badge when announcing himself as a police officer" and demanding that the driver stop, even if it was a
violation of state law, was "irrelevant to the issue of whether at the moment of the shooting [the officer] had
probable cause" to shoot).
488 Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1997).
489 id.
490 id.
491 Id.
492 Id. at 100.
493 Krueger v. Fuhr, 991 F.2d 435, 437 (8th Cir. 1993).
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pull a knife from his waistband.494 Thinking the man was going to attack, the officer slowed
down and shot four times, killing him.495 The officer ordered the suspect to freeze when he first
encountered him, "[h]owever.. .under the urgent circumstances facing [the officer], the absence
of a warning immediately preceding the shooting does not render his use of deadly force
constitutionally unreasonable. 496
In an Eleventh Circuit case, a stolen truck rammed the back of a deputy's vehicle, and
sped off at high speed. 4 Intending to disable the truck, the deputy fired three rounds without
warning the occupants.498 A bullet punctured the spine of a passenger, instantly paralyzing
him.499 The court decided that the passenger was "seized" because he was hit by a bullet meant
to stop him and the driver. 50 0 A jury could conclude that the seizure was unreasonable and it was
feasible for the deputy to warn the truck's occupants before opening fire. 50 1 However, qualified
immunity was afforded the deputy because the Garner Court did not define factual situations
when a warning was necessary.50 2 To the same effect are district court decisions.0 3
Compare the following district court case, which deals with officer identification.
50 4
Officers wearing police caps and bullet-proof vests with police identification knocked and
announced that they were police with a search warrant. 50 5 When there was no response, they
broke the door open with a battering ram.50 6 Inside, they continued to announce, "[P]olice
officers, we have a search warrant." 50 7 Observing the broken door, and not hearing that the
494 id.
495 Id.
496Id. at 440.
497 Vaughan v. Cox, 264 F.3d 1027, 1031 (1lth Cir. 2001).
498 Id.
4 9 9
Id. at 1032.
50 Id. at 1033.
501 Id.
502 Id. at 1036-37.
50' For similar district court decisions, see the following cases:
Frane v. Kijowski, 992 F. Supp. 985, 991 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Officers looked through a kitchen window, and
saw the intruder-husband pointing what looked like a gun at his wife's head. The court concluded that a reasonable
officer was justified in thinking that the wife's life was in danger. Exigent circumstances justified the failure to
knock and announce. It was not feasible for the officers to give a warning before shooting through the window. Id.
Ridgeway v. City of Woolwich Township Police Dep't., 924 F. Supp. 653, 660 (D.N.J. 1996). The plaintiff
rammed a police car, flipping it on its side. The plaintiff leaned toward the floor before getting out and appeared to
point something at the officer. The evidence was disputed about whether the officer warned him to stop or he would
shoot. The officer fired 10 to 20 rounds at the plaintiff as he ran. The officer reasonably believed he had to use
deadly force to apprehend the plaintiff and to prevent his escape. It was not feasible to issue a warning, since the
plaintiff knew he was being pursued and had given no indication he would submit to police authority. Based on the
belief that the plaintiff was armed, the officer could have reasonably concluded that a "warning would cause the
plaintiff to turn and use his weapon... " Id.
Maravilla v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 1363, 1378-79 (N.D. id. 1994). ATF agents were executing an
arrest warrant for a gang leader at his home. Agents saw the gang leader's father fire a gun from a second floor
bedroom window at agents outside. The agents fatally shot him. Summary judgment for the defendants: Even if the
agents did not shout a warning before they shot the gang leader's father as they claimed, they acted reasonably given
the immediate and serious threat. Id.
504 Sledd v. Lindsay, 864 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
505 Id. at 823.
506 Id. at 824.
507 id.
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intruders were police, the plaintiff got a rifle.5 8 An officer identified himself and told the
plaintiff to drop the rifle, but he stepped into the stairway with the gun pointed at the officer,
whereupon the other officers shot.50 9 The district court granted summary judgment for the
officers. 510 Although officers could not use deadly force in situations where they created the
dangerous encounter, here they did not because "there existed no clear standard of law that an
officer must obtain confirmation that the threatening suspect knows that he is confronting a
peace officer prior to using deadly force.
'
"
511
4. Multiple Shots
The Constitution does not prescribe the number of shots that can be fired or the number
of officers who can fire them. It is improper to conclude that excessive force was used because
multiple shots were fired so long as the shots were fired in a very few seconds and the officers
ceased firing the instant they perceived that the subject was no longer a threat. However, it is
constitutionally unreasonable for officers to continue to fire after the threat is over.
Summary judgment was granted for the defense in a Fourth Circuit case.5 12 A handcuffed
arrestee sitting in the front seat of a police vehicle released the seatbelt and was able to position
his arms to aim a small handgun at the officer.513 When the arrestee did not respond to an order
to drop the gun, officers fired twenty-two shots, killing him.514 The court said the officer's
actions were reasonable.515 Officers "confronted an intoxicated individual pointing a gun at them
from only a few feet away with his finger on the trigger."516 On the issue of multiple shots, the
Court held that "multiple shots were fired does not suggest the officers shot mindlessly as much
as it indicates that they sought to ensure the elimination of a deadly threat."
517
More often, opinions treat the issue of multiple shots as creating a factual dispute
requiring jury resolution. In the Sixth Circuit, 518 a 37-year-old paranoid schizophrenic man with
knives in each hand refused to return to a psychiatric institute.519 An officer forced open his
apartment door. 52 An officer fired two Tazer darts, but the psychiatric patient overcame the
effects and rushed toward an officer, with the knives pointed at him521 Two officers shot, and he
fell downstairs to a landing, but still held a knife.522 They told him to drop the knife. 523 The
psychiatric patient got up, was hit with two additional Taser darts, and charged upstairs at the
508 Id.
509 id.
510Id. at 831.
511 Id. at 830.
512 Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 1996).
513 Id. at 642.
514 id.
515 Id. at 641.
516Id. at 642.
517Id. at 643.
518 Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1992).
519d. at 1039-40.
520 d. at 1040.
521 Id
522 id
523 Id.
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officers, still holding a knife. 524 In the course of these events, they fired several more times.
525
Reversing summary judgment for the officers, the court said,
[The psychiatric patient] was shot a total of twenty-two times... even though he
was armed only with knives. In addition, plaintiffs raise a genuine issue of fact as
to whether, in the second and third round of discharges of the officers' revolvers,
the officers may have shot [the psychiatric patient] even though he posed no
serious threat of physical harm. Finally, the record suggests that some ten to
twelve minutes elapsed between the second and third series of shots, during which
time [the plaintiff claimed the psychiatric patient] dropped his knife. Given the
current state of the record, we believe that a reasonable jury might conclude that
the officers' repeated use of their revolvers violated this court's clearly
established precedent on the use of deadly force.
526
The court also found an issue of fact concerning municipal liability:
[T]he the fact that the [c]ity offered a seven-hour course entitled "Disturbed-
Distress[ed] Persons" [was] insufficient in and of itself to shield the [c]ity from
liability....
... we disagree that the mere fact that the [c]ity had a policy of dealing with
barricaded persons constitutes conclusive a proof that it was not deliberately
indifferent to the rights of individuals in [the decedent's] position.527
Similarly, a suspect gained control of an officer's baton, caused him to fall backwards
and hit his head, and then struck the officer with his baton a disputed number of times.528 After a
warning to stop attacking, the officer fired six shots.529 Both the officer and suspect got up, at
which time the officer shot four more times.530 The Ninth Circuit overturned summary judgment
for the defense. 531 There was a jury question on whether the second use of deadly force was
justified.532 The suspect had been wounded, no longer had the baton, and the officer had non-
deadly use of force options.
533
524Id. at 1041.
525 Id.
526Id. at 1045.
527 id
528 Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1992).
529 id
53 0 id.
531 Id.
532 Id. at 886-87.
533 Id. at 887; see also District of Columbia v. Jackson, 810 A.2d 388 (D.C. 2002). A man held his mother hostage at
knifepoint. Emergency Response Team (ERT) officers told the perpetrator to drop the knife. Instead, he raised it as
if to stab her in the chest. An officer fired and struck him in the face and then fired again as he was spinning to the
ground. As the man still held the knife or was reaching toward it on the ground as he was trying to regain his
footing, three other officers shot. Of 21 shots fired, seven struck him in the back. The jury found that the three
officers used excessive force in continuing to shoot after the threat had been eliminated. The court of appeals
reduced an award of $2,149,998 in compensatory damages to $180,000 and eliminated $3,999,000 in punitive
damages. Id. at 390-91.
Winter/Spring 2005
Richmond Journal ofLaw and the Public Interest
5. Risk to Third Persons
At least one court has said that a jury should not consider the possible risk to members of
the public from officers' use of deadly force against an intended subject, who later becomes the
plaintiff or the plaintiffs decedent.
In a case from the Fourth Circuit, a mentally disabled man walked into a barbershop,
wearing only a cap and sunglasses and carrying a knife. 3 Police officers arrived on the
scene. 535 One of the people leaving the barbershop told the officers that a naked man with the
knife was inside. 536 The naked man with the knife began to approach another man standing just
outside the barbershop. 537 "Perceiving that [the naked man with the knife] was attempting to
attack [the other man], and after unsuccessfully trying to subdue him with mace, the officers shot
and killed [him]., 538 The decedent's mother filed suit.539 The trial court instructed that the jury
was "not to consider in reaching [its] determination the public safety of other individuals. The
only suit here is the determination of whether excessive force was used against the deceased. 54 °
On appeal from a verdict for the defendants, the court upheld the instruction because "the
question is not whether the officer acted reasonably vis-a-vis the world at large. Rather, the
question is whether the officer acted reasonably as against the plaintiff ... That inquiry is not
dependent at all on whether the officer did or did not subject third parties to risk., 541
6. State Law, Department Regulations
Under the common law, a violation of a regulation or statute may constitute negligence
per se. In contrast, the present violation of a departmental order or internal operating procedure
may subject an officer to discipline within the department, but it does not establish a duty of
conduct toward the public, absent supporting evidence that the directive conforms with a
generally accepted, meaning national, standard of conduct.
542
In section 1983 litigation, the adherence to a department directive does not render the
conduct constitutional, and conversely the failure to follow a department protocol does not
Kessler v. Barowsky, 931 P.2d 641, 651 (Idaho 1997). The state police crisis response team (CRT) was
called to assist a sheriff in the arrest of a reserve deputy. After being pepper sprayed, the reserve deputy drew his
gun and pointed it down the hall. Bullets from CRT officers' weapons struck him in the shoulder, he rolled to his
left, and they fired additional, fatal rounds. Decision: contested facts should have precluded summary judgment on
qualified immunity. "[A]lthough it may not have been excessive to use deadly force after [the reserve deputy] pulled
out his gun, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether it was excessive to begin a second volley of shots after
[he] was hit and lying on the floor." Id. at 657.
534 Howerton v. Fletcher, 213 F.3d 171, 172 (4th Cir. 2000).
535 Id. at 172.
5 3 6 
id.
5 3 7 
id.
538 Id.
5 3 9 
id.
540 id.
541 Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
542 See, e.g., Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 757 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Abney v. District of Columbia,
580 A.2d 1036, 1041 (D.C. 1990).
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establish a constitutional violation.543 The issue usually arises in connection with department
regulations that require officers to use minimal (as distinct from reasonable) force and to exhaust
every other alternative before resorting to deadly force. Courts often exclude evidence of more
restrictive department rules, or instruct the jury that they do not establish the constitutional
standard.
There are numerous examples. The "failure of' the officer "to display his badge when
announcing himself as a police officer" and demanding that the driver stop, even if it was a
violation of state law, was "irrelevant to the issue of whether at the moment of the shooting" the
officer had probable cause to shoot.
54 4
The Sixth Circuit held that "even a negligent departure from established police procedure
does not necessarily signal violation of constitutional protections." 545 The fact that the city
amended its deadly force policy after the incident to prohibit an officer from intentionally or
recklessly placing himself/herself in front of an oncoming vehicle when the use of force is a
likely outcome was not determinative. 546 The new policy was not constitutionally mandated
because the city made the policy more restrictive did not establish that the prior policies were
unconstitutional.547
The Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs claim that an officer should be liable for
violating a city policy that forbids officers to fire at moving vehicles in order to apprehend a
misdemeanor suspect.548 The issue was whether the officer "violated the Constitution, not
whether he should be disciplined by the local police force. A city can certainly choose to hold its
officers to a higher standard than that required by the Constitution without being subjected to
increased liability under § 1983 ."5
The next case involved the shooting death of a suspect after a high-speed chase.550 The
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Model Policy on off-duty officers engaging
in traffic stops under circumstances where they are personally involved was ruled inadmissible,
whether it is wise public policy to allow off-duty police officers to chase late
night traffic violators is beside the point; the action is not unconstitutional and,
more to the point, it has nothing to do with the key issue of whether the force used
after a suspect is collared is excessive under the circumstances.
55 1
543 Cf Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 (1984) (involving a member of the highway patrol who alleged that his
discharge violated due process. "Officials sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity
merely because their conduct violates some [state] statutory or administrative provision."); Edwards v. Baer, 863
F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1988). An officer's arrest on an invalid warrant violated a special order; but "police department
guidelines do not create a constitutional right." Id. at 608.
544 Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 780 (4th Cir. 1993).
545 Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1992).546 Id. at 1280.
547 Id. at 1281.
548 Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992).
549 id.
550 Soller v. Moore, 84 F.3d 964, 966-67 (7th Cir. 1996).
551 Id. at 969.
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In another case, police pursued an upset, intoxicated man who cocked a poker over his
head and charged an officer.552 The officer tried to retreat, but he tripped.553 From two arm
lengths away, he shot.554 The plaintiff contended police should have used less-than-lethal
alternatives like chemical spray or a dog, but the Seventh Circuit held
We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert
testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been
able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of
police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to
buy this equipment (or increase its police force) .... [W]e think it is clear that the
Constitution does not enact a police administrator's equipment list. We decline to
use this case to impose constitutional equipment requirements on the police.
555
In an Eighth Circuit case, the facts were:
[The decedent], carrying a pump-action, "sawed-off' shotgun, was hiding in the
garage, either crouched down or prone near the nose of [an automobile]. When
[the police dog] growled, [the decedent] fired one shot from his shotgun. This
shot struck and killed [the police dog]. Deputies ...then instantly fired their
semiautomatic duty pistols. They fired thirty-two shots, emptying the pistols'
magazines. Approximately fourteen of the shots struck [the decedent], and one
bullet-the sequence of shots is unknown-killed him. 556
The court noted that:
No federal court has held that the Constitution forbids police officers, after being
fired upon by a suspect, from returning fire....
[The plaintiff] ...argues that the deputies should be held liable because they
failed to follow [s]heriff s [d]epartment guidelines, and that their actions might
have helped precipitate the confrontation. In particular, [the plaintiff] and her
expert witnesses claim the two deputies should have waited for additional backup,
barricaded [the decedent] in the garage stall with a patrol car, or engaged in other
protective actions. Most of the guidelines cited are for the protection of the
sheriffs deputies, not of armed suspects, and in any event the breach of such
guidelines is not dispositive to our determination of whether the deputies violated
a clearly established constitutional right.557
552 Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1144-45 (7th Cir. 1994).
551 Id. at 1146.
554 id.
555 Id. at 1150-51.
556 Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1201 (8th Cir. 1999).
55 7 Id. at 1203.
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In a Ninth Circuit case, Scott v. Henrich,558 police responded to reports of a man who was
acting "crazy" and firing a gun.559 Officers banged and kicked on the door, yelling, "Police, ...
open up. 560 As the door opened, police said the decedent stood in the doorway and pointed a
gun at them.561 An officer fired but missed.562 Believing the shot came from the decedent,
another officer fired four more.563 The plaintiff argued "the police officers' conduct violated
police department guidelines for dealing with barricaded suspects," 564 however,
Assuming internal police guidelines are relevant to determining whether use of
force is objectively reasonable, they are relevant only when one of their purposes
is to protect the individual against whom force is used .... Both the guidelines at
issue here and the context in which they appear in the police manual show they
were meant to safeguard the police and other innocent parties, not the suspect.
565
In a Tenth Circuit case, in response to the defendants' assertion of a qualified immunity
defense, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit of an expert, which he argued supported his
contention that genuine issues of material fact existed.566 The court observed that "[t]he expert's
affidavit does not, however, highlight a disputed issue of fact; rather, it simply contains the
ultimate conclusion that the officers' use of force did not conform with accepted police
guidelines and practices and was, therefore, excessive." 567 The Court continued "[w]e have, of
course, recognized that claims based on violations of state law and police procedure are not
actionable under § 1983."568
However, when department operating procedures establish a standard of conduct, they
may be probative of the constitutional reasonableness of officers' actions. An officer tried to stop
a homeless, emotionally disturbed man who had a knife by hitting him with the officer's squad
car. 6 Officers formed a semi-circle and ordered the homeless man to drop the knife.57 ° An
officer "maced" him, whereupon he ran toward a street.571 Without yelling a warning, the officer
who hit the man with his squad car shot at him twice.572 Another officer fired a shotgun.573 The
Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision granting qualified immunity.574 Although
558 39 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1994).
55 9 Id. at 914.
560 id.
561 Id
562 id
563 Id
564Id at 915.
565 Id. at 915-16 (citations omitted).
566 Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2001).
56 7 Id. at 1133.
568 Id.
569 Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 468 (8th Cir. 1995).
5 7 0 id.
571 Id. at 469.
572 id
573 Id
574 Id. at 474.
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"police department guidelines [on dealing with emotionally disturbed persons] do not create a
constitutional right, they are relevant to the analysis of constitutionally excessive force."
575
7. More Prudent Alternatives
The Fourth Amendment does not mandate that officers choose what in hindsight was the
best or least intrusive alternative.576 Officers must only act within a range of objective
reasonableness. 577 Courts may exclude expert or other testimony of what the officers could have
done better or differently, or inform the jury that the constitutional touchstone is the objective
reasonableness of what the officers did do.
When police tried to serve a warrant at night on a 69-year-old man for a minor charge, he
came to his back door with a shotgun.578 A deputy shined a flashlight on the man and told him to
drop the gun.579 Instead, the man fired the gun in the direction of one of the deputies. 580 Another
deputy fired eleven rounds, two of them hitting the man in the back.581 The Seventh Circuit
upheld a jury verdict for the shooting deputy. 582 Although relevant circumstances were not
limited to the precise moment of the shooting (and included the fact that the elderly man was to
be arrested for a minor charge), it was not improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that the
deputies did not need to use "all feasible alternatives" to avoid the situation in which deadly
force was used.583
The Seventh Circuit held similarly in another case:
There is no precedent in this Circuit (or any other) which says that the
Constitution requires law enforcement officers to use all feasible alternatives to
avoid a situation where deadly force can justifiably be used .... [W]e rejected the
proposition that the Fourth Amendment prohibits creating unreasonably
dangerous circumstances in which to effect a legal arrest of a suspect....
The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even
less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. The only test is whether
what the police officers actually did was reasonable.
584
575 Id. at 472. (quoting Cole v. Borne, 993 F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1993)).
576 Plaskas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985);
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973).577 Plaskas, 19 F.3d at 1149; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
578 Deering v. Reich, 183 F.3d 645, 647-48 (7th Cir. 1999).579 Id. at 648.
580 Id.
581 Id.
582 Id at 648, 654.
583 Id. at 652-53.
584 Plakas v. Drinsky, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148-49 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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What began as an investigatory stop of a teenager riding a possibly stolen bicycle
progressed to a violent beating of the officer, then her shooting the teenager. 585 Regardless of
preceding events, less intrusive means were not available at the time of the shooting.
586
State law enforcement officers were confronted with a man who refused to drop his
weapon, despite repeated orders, and who instead fired the first shot, followed by several
more.58 7 "[A]ll of the troopers at the scene were aware that [a trooper] had been wounded, and
that his assailant was still armed and unwilling to surrender." 588 The officer giving the
authorization to shoot, and the trooper who shot the decedent "could reasonably have believed
that this was a situation in which there was a significant threat of death or serious physical
injury. 5 89 The Eighth Circuit would not ask "whether the course of action chosen was the most
prudent or the wisest one," but only "whether the decision to use deadly force was objectively
reasonable, and we hold that it was as a matter of law."
590
In one case, the trial court excluded evidence that the officer should have responded
differently, by waiting for a supervisor, calling the SWAT team, or using less than lethal force.
591
The Eighth Circuit held that the evidence was properly excluded.592 Evidence that the defendant
officer should have done things differently was irrelevant, the question being whether he acted
reasonably. 593 "[T]he Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, not unreasonable or
ill-advised conduct in general. Consequently, we scrutinize only the seizure itself, not the events
leading to the seizure, for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment."
594
In the case of Scott v. Henrich,595 the Ninth Circuit found that:
Plaintiff argues that the officers should have used alternative measures before
approaching and knocking on the door where [decedent] was located. But, as the
text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the appropriate inquiry is whether the
officers acted reasonably, not whether they had less intrusive alternatives
available to them. Requiring officers to find and choose the least intrusive
alternative would 'induce tentativeness[,] . . . deter police from protecting the
public... [and] entangle the courts in endless second guessing of police decisions
,596
The reasonableness standard:
585 Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 955 (7th Cir. 1992).
516Id. at 962.
587 Tauke v. Stine, 120 F.3d 1363, 1364-65 (8th Cir. 1997).
588 Id. at 1366.
589 id.
590 id.
591 Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 1995).
592Id. at 649.
59 31 d. at 648.594 Id. (quoting Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993)).
595 See supra text accompanying notes 558-65.
596 Scott, 39 F.3d at 915.
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does not require that officers use alternative less intrusive means .... If we were
to ... consider the expert's assertions regarding the failure to use pepper spray
and other tactical measures, we would be evaluating the officers' conduct from
the 20/20 perspective of hindsight rather than from the perspective of an officer
making split-second judgments on the scene." 597
District court and state court decisions make the same point.
598
8. Conduct Preceding Shooting
Plaintiffs may argue that the defendants violated the Fourth Amendment because they
unreasonably manufactured the danger that required the use of deadly force. The defense
response, adopted by most decisions, is that the shooting is the seizure, and that Fourth
Amendment scrutiny is limited to the events immediately preceding the shooting. There is thus a
basis for the exclusion of pre-seizure evidence, or, as is more appropriate, an instruction that the
jury should base their decision on the reasonableness of the shooting itself.
A minority of cases will break the incident into segments if separate constitutional
violations are claimed. A few distinguish between negligent and reckless conduct and will find
liability if an earlier Fourth Amendment violation provoked, i.e., caused, the shooting.
Regardless, the shooting officers should be entitled to qualified immunity. Even if they
committed a Fourth Amendment violation, the law does not clearly establish that their prior
mistakes - constitutional or not - can be considered in whether they justifiably shot in self-
defense at the time of the shooting.
The first cases considered limit the reasonableness inquiry to events immediately before
the shooting. In the Fourth Circuit, the court held that the "failure of [the officer] to display his
badge when announcing himself as a police officer" and demanding that the driver stop, even if
it was a violation of state law, was "irrelevant to the issue of whether at the moment of the
shooting" the officer had probable cause to shoot. 599 The officer's use of deadly force should be
evaluated with respect to circumstances existing immediately prior to and at the moment force
was used because the evidence of what occurred before was not relevant or admissible.
60 0
The Fifth Circuit recognized in a similar case that "regardless of what had transpired up
until the shooting itself, [the suspect's] movements gave the officer reason to believe, at least at
597 Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1133 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted).
591 See the following district and state court decisions for the same point:
McRae v. Tena, 914 F. Supp. 363, 357 (D. Arizona 1996) (holding the law did not require the officer to
retreat when threatened with the use of force, or to ascertain and choose the least intrusive alternative);
Estate of Saldana v. Weitzel, 912 F. Supp. 413, 416 (D. Wisc. 1996) ("By closing to fifteen feet, [the
officer] ... created the situation in which the use of deadly force was necessary. Even if the plaintiffs expert is
correct and closing to fifteen feet was poor policing, poor policing, however, is not a constitutional violation.
Logically, [the officer] did not violate [the decedent's] rights because [the decedent] was not seized until [the
officer] shot.");
Yellowback v. City of Sioux Falls, 600 N.W.2d 554, 560 (S.D. 1999) ("[T]hat the officer might have
pursued other methods before that probable cause [to shoot] arose-is simply irrelevant.").
599 Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 780 (4th Cir. 1993).
600 Greenidge v. Ruffm, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991).
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that moment, that there was a threat of physical harm." 601 The contention that the officer
approaching an apparent drug transaction between two men in a car and a pedestrian created the
situation where a fatal error was more likely possible was a basis for a state negligence action,
but not a Fourth Amendment claim.
60 2
In a decision from the Tenth Circuit, the plaintiff specifically claimed that the officers
acted unreasonably in creating the need to use force. 603 In addition to considering whether the
officers reasonably believed they were in danger at the time they used force, the court
considered:
whether [the officers'] own reckless or deliberate conduct during the seizure
unreasonably created the need to use such force. An officer's conduct before the
suspect threatens force is therefore relevant provided it is immediately connected
to the seizure and the threat of force. This approach is simply a specific
application of the totality of the circumstances approach inherent in the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness standard. We emphasize, however, that, in order to
constitute excessive force, the conduct arguably creating the need for force must
be immediately connected with the seizure and must rise to the level of
recklessness, rather than negligence. The primary focus of our inquiry, therefore,
remains on whether the officer was in danger at the exact moment of the threat of
force.6 °4
According to the plaintiff, the officers' actions after he left the house and began walking toward
the street "constituted reckless and deliberate conduct giving rise to the threat of force."
60 5
Specifically, he argues the officers should have remained under cover rather than
following him in an attempt to knock him to the ground. He apparently argues
that their failure to take cover was particularly reckless in light of the attack dog's
release, which increased the risk of force. We have, however, suggested that an
officer's failure to take cover is at issue only insofar as it [bears] upon whether the
officer's life [is] truly in danger. Moreover, even if we were to consider whether
an officer's failure to take cover contributed to the need for force, [the plaintiff]
has clearly failed to establish that the officers' actions in this case rise to the level
of reckless or deliberate conduct. In this case, [the plaintiff] communicated he had
a gun, emerged from the house covering what could reasonably be interpreted as a
weapon, and began walking away from the house into the street. The officers'
response in attempting to stop [the plaintiff] was reasonable under the
circumstances. [The plaintiff] has, therefore, failed to establish that the defendants
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
60 6
601 Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1992).
602 Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1353 (5th Cir. 1985).
603 Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001).
604 Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
605 Id.
606 id.
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In another Tenth Circuit case, a motorist punched the officer in the nose, ran a knife
across the officer's stomach, ignored repeated requests to drop the knife and continued to
advance in an attack position.60 7 In a prior case, the court had "refuse[ed] to consider whether an
officer who used deadly force in self-defense had caused the suspect to behave in a threatening
manner;" instead, the court "followed other circuits that have confined the reasonableness
inquiry in excessive force cases 'to whether the officer was in danger at the moment of the
,,,608609threat." 60 8 The majority of district and state courts adhere to a similar analysis.
The next cases considered expand the scope of the reasonableness inquiry under the
circumstances noted. In a case from the Sixth Circuit, undercover officers were engaged in
607 Romero v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 60 F.3d 702, 703 (10th Cir. 1995).
608 Id at 704-05 (citing Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995)).
609 See the following cases adhering to the same analysis:
Estate of Saldana v. Weitzel, 912 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Wisc. 1996). The decedent was holding a knife and
shouting. He was drunk and threatening people. An officer shot from about fifteen feet. The plaintiff argued that,
"[b]y closing to fifteen feet, [the officer] ... created the situation in which the use of deadly force was necessary.
Even if the plaintiff's expert is correct and closing to fifteen feet was poor policing, poor policing, however, is not a
constitutional violation. Logically, [the officer] did not violate [the decedent's] rights because [the decedent] was not
seized until [the officer] shot ..."). Id. at 415-16.
St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 885 F. Supp. 349 (D. N.H. 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 71 F.3d 20 (1st.
Cir. 1995). In a shooting, the issue is not whether the agency negligently created the risk that deadly force would
have to be used, but whether, at the time of the seizure itself, i.e., the shooting, the use of lethal force was
permissible. Id. at 356.
James v. City of Chester, 852 F. Supp. 1288 (D. S.C. 1994). The court rejected the theory that the police
unreasonably increased risk by their earlier actions. The court would "focus only upon the reasonableness of the
conduct at the moment [the officer] made the decision to use deadly force." "[The subject] was waving a baseball
bat over his head while threatening to kill the officer. The officer, dressed in a police uniform, made repeated
requests that [the subject] drop the bat, retreated as far as he could, and then made the decision to use deadly force.
Under the circumstances, [the officer] had probable cause to believe that [the subject] posed a significant threat of
serious bodily injury to [the officer]." Id. at 1295;
Linder v. Richmond County, Ga., 844 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Ga. 1994). A woman called police saying a
prowler entered the garage, setting off an alarm. Her 88-year-old husband, who was hard of hearing, went out to the
backyard with a loaded pistol. When the deputy sheriff arrived, he came upon the husband and, thinking he was the
prowler, told him to drop the gun. The husband allegedly turned toward the deputy sheriff and fired. The deputy
fired back, with one bullet taking effect on the husband and the other going through the garage and striking the
prowler. Even if the husband shot first and then turned toward the deputy, the deputy was entitled to summary
judgment. "Much of [p]laintiffs' evidence and legal analysis focus on the alleged unreasonableness of [the deputy]
prior to shooting [the husband]. Plaintiffs specifically argue that [the deputy] was unreasonable in beginning his
approach towards the garage before a backup officer arrived, in failing to utilize a position of cover in confronting
[the husband], and in failing to use the word 'police' in his command to [the husband] to drop the gun. However
unreasonable these actions may have been, they have no bearing on the reasonableness of [the deputy's] actions at
the time he was forced to make the decision whether to shoot [the husband]" (emphasis in original). Id. at 764-65,
767;
Yellowback v. City of Sioux Falls, 600 N.W.2d 554, 560 (S.D. 1999). A suspect who had stabbed his
brother had a knife at his own throat and advanced toward the officers, as they shouted to drop the knife. When he
got within eighteen to twenty-four inches from an officer's gun muzzle, the officer shot. The trial court excluded
expert testimony that the officers had not pursued certain strategies in dealing with the suspect, portions of the police
department policies and procedures manual concerning use of force and mental cases, and an equipment list showing
that batons were issued to the officers. Discussion: "We limit our scrutiny of the seizure in this case to this question:
at the moment of the shooting did [the shooter] have probable cause to believe that [the suspect] posed a significant
threat of death or serious physical injury to himself or others? .... The answer to that question is clearly 'yes' ....
Consequently, the exclusion of this evidence could not provide grounds for a new trial." Id. at 556-57, 560.
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anticrime surveillance from an unmarked squad vehicle in a high crime neighborhood, when they
observed a man in the dimly-lit parking lot of a market displaying a long gun at port-arms. 610
Actually, the gunman was acting as a security guard for his daughter-in-law, who was
responsible for depositing illegal betting proceeds and was seated inside her car.6 1 1 After an
undercover officer told the man to drop his weapon, a firefight ensued.612 The suspect circled
behind the market and reappeared with his shotgun aimed at the officers, who shot in self-
defense.613 The court's analysis segmented the incident into the approach, the initial firefight in
front of the market, and the final shot.614 Although the officers' approach violated that
department's policy for undercover officers, any unreasonableness of their actions was not a
consideration in the use of excessive force. 615 But because the man's family contested "all use of
deadly force" against him, the court had to scrutinize the second segment, the firefight in front of
the market, and not just the last segment in which the officers fired in self-defense. 616 As to the
middle segment, there was a factual dispute as to whether the man was fired upon by
unidentified, non-uniformed officers whom he took to be robbers, and as a consequence whether
their use of deadly force was reasonable. 617 On the basis of disputed facts, the court had to
remand the case for trial.618
Another case involved the use of a cab during a shooting. 619 If, as the plaintiff
contended, the officer unreasonably moved in front of the cab giving the driver no time to stop,
the decedent did not cause the danger, and the use of deadly force was unjustified.62 ° If the driver
could see the officer before he accelerated, the shooting was justified.62'
The Ninth Circuit will review antecedent events if an earlier, independent Fourth
Amendment violation intentionally or recklessly causes a second Fourth Amendment violation:
the self-defense shooting.622 Following a pursuit, the motorist and off-duty detective engaged in
a struggle over possession of the detective's gun and the detective shot, killing him.623 The
plaintiffs theory was that the detective made tactical errors and "shouldn't have gotten himself
into the situation, so he couldn't constitutionally shoot his way out of it."624 After surveying
relevant caselaw, the court noted that a plaintiff could not avoid summary judgment "by simply
producing an expert's report that an officer's conduct leading up to a deadly confrontation was
imprudent, inappropriate, or even reckless." 625 However,
610 Claybrook v. Birchwell, 274 F.3d 1098, 1100 (6th Cir. 2001).
611Id. at 1100-01.
612Id. at 1101.
613 Id
614Id at 1105.
6 1 5 
id
616 Id. (emphasis in original).
617 id.
6 1 8 
id.
619 Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 1993).
62 0 d. at 235.
621 Id.
622 Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2001).
623 Id. at 1181.
624Id. at 1185-86.
625 Id. at 1189.
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where an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if
the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment violation, he may be held
liable for his otherwise defensive use of deadly force.
• . . if an officer's provocative actions are objectively unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, . . . liability is established, and the question becomes the
scope of liability, or what harms the constitutional violation proximately caused..
... our precedents do not forbid any consideration of events leading up to a
shooting. But neither do they permit a plaintiff to establish a Fourth Amendment
violation based merely on bad tactics that result in a deadly confrontation that
could have been avoided....
... the fact that an officer negligently gets himself into a dangerous situation will
not make it unreasonable for him to use force to defend himself. The Fourth
Amendment's "reasonableness" standard is not the same as the standard of
"reasonable care" under tort law, and negligent acts do not incur constitutional
liability. An officer may fail to exercise "reasonable care" as a matter of tort law
yet still be a constitutionally "reasonable" officer. Thus, even if an officer
negligently provokes a violent response, that negligent act will not transform
otherwise reasonable subsequent use of force into a Fourth Amendment violation.
But if ... an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent response, and
the provocation is an independent constitutional violation, that provocation may
render the officer's otherwise reasonable defensive use of force unreasonable as
a matter of law. In such a case, the officer's initial unconstitutional provocation,
which arises from intentional or reckless conduct rather than mere negligence,
would proximately cause the subsequent application of deadly force.
626
Applying the rule to the facts, the court found no Fourth Amendment violation, and did not reach
the issue of qualified immunity.
627
In the case at bar, [the motorist's] estate has not established that [the detective] provoked
[the motorist's] attack, much less committed an independent Fourth Amendment
violation that provoked it .... But even if we were to assume for the sake of argument
that a jury could conclude that [the detective] should have sat in his car until backup
arrived, or donned all of his equipment before approaching [the motorist], or have taken
precautions against [the motorist] grabbing him by his throat and pulling himself out of
the car window to attack the detective, or that [the detective] should have dropped off his
wife and daughter somewhere before dealing with [the motorist], none of [the
detective's] supposed errors could be deemed intentional or reckless, much less
unconstitutional, provocations that caused [the motorist] to attack him.
626 Id. at 1189-91 (some internal quotations and citations omitted).
627 d. at 1191.
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... one hundred fifty seconds filled with hot pursuit followed by hand-to-hand combat is
not a comfortably ample period in which to consider and evaluate the prudence of
alternative tactics.628
In another case, a man armed with guns and ammunition parked in front of his sister's
house.629 A lieutenant on the scene told him to drop the gun and reached into the car to grab it,
while a second officer held the decedent's arm, and a third officer tried to open the passenger
side door.630 The decedent pointed his gun at the officer on the passenger side, then moved the
gun toward the lieutenant and other officer on the other side, who then fired twelve rounds,
taking effect on the decedent. 631 The Tenth Circuit held that disputed facts precluded summary
632 he3holjudgment. The whole incident lasted only 90 seconds.633 The preceding actions of the officers
were so "immediately connected" to the decedent's threat of force that they had to be scrutinized
for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.634 A reasonable jury could conclude, in finding
the facts, that the officers' behavior was reckless and caused the need to use lethal force.
635
Under the current state of the law, in lethal force scenarios leading ultimately to a seizure
(i.e., shooting), Fourth Amendment reasonableness scrutiny is generally applied to the seizure
itself, and not to whether antecedent events were objectively unreasonable, i.e., involved poor
decisions or violations of standard operating procedures or whether better, less dangerous
alternatives were available. Police officers whose decision to shoot in self-defense is objectively
reasonable do not violate the Fourth Amendment. They also have the defense of qualified
immunity. In deciding whether to shoot, they are not required to consider whether their pre-
seizure conduct was unreasonable. Accordingly, since the point at which Fourth Amendment
review attaches is not clearly established, officers who deviate from professional norms or
unreasonably create the risk that deadly force will have to be used (e.g., "shoot their way out" of
a bad situation) are entitled to qualified immunity. The court should afford immunity unless no
reasonable police officer could have believed his/her conduct complied with the Constitution. To
do less, it can be argued, makes for timorous, ineffective police officers.
628 Id.
629 Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997).
6 3 0 
id.
631 Id
632Id, at 844.
633 Id. at 839.
634 Id. at 841.
635 Id.; see also Kessler v. Barowsky, 931 P.2d 641 (Idaho 1997). The state police crisis response team (CRT) was
called to assist a sheriff in the arrest of a reserve deputy, who was charged with sexually assaulting his daughter. The
reserve deputy had martial arts experience and served in a special forces unit in the military. Since he would be
armed when arrested at work, the plan called for him to be pepper sprayed to subdue him. After being pepper
sprayed, the reserve deputy drew his gun and pointed it down the hall. Bullets from CRT officers' weapons struck
him in the shoulder, he rolled to his left, and they fired additional, fatal rounds. Decision: contested facts should
have precluded summary judgment on qualified immunity. "A reasonable person could.., conclude that [the
reserve deputy] pulled his gun in self-defense after being confronted by camouflaged men holding a submachine gun
at his chest and spraying him with Cap-stun in a locked hallway. Therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact
concerning whether the use of the Cap-stun caused [the reserve deputy's] reaction and unnecessarily escalated the
situation, leading to [his] death." Id. at 651-52, 657.
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On the other hand, under existing law, there are a number of ways in which an entire
incident can be subjected to reasonableness analysis. One is to break the incident up into
segments, each of which has a Fourth Amendment issue, e.g., obtaining a search warrant, making
a no-knock entry of a residence, resulting in a fight inside, and then ending in a shooting. Each
segment is separately reviewed for Fourth Amendment reasonableness and the plaintiff could
potentially be compensated for each violation. Similarly, the plaintiff could try to show the
interconnection of each segment; one Fourth Amendment violation led to another, culminating in
the shooting, e.g., a tumultuous, unannounced entry led to violence.
It is appropriate to expand the reasonableness review where supervisors or the
municipality are defendants because the plaintiff has alleged that they created a risk that
ultimately caused the constitutional harm. For example, if supervisory "deliberate indifference"
as to the manner in which the raid was planned or a defective training policy or custom on
obtaining and executing warrants was affirmatively linked to the unnecessary use of deadly force
against the subject, then the raid supervisors or the municipality could be held liable for the
Fourth Amendment violation. Liability is forced upstream at supervisors and the municipality. In
that case, qualified immunity may relieve individual officers of personal liability for simply
having been positioned in the wrong place at the wrong time: a conduit for the constitutional
deprivation but not themselves a cause.
Finally, the plaintiff might have a common law negligence claim for deviations from
generally accepted police practices, in which event evidence of pre-seizure activities would be
relevant to the state law claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
The crucial points are as follows:
(1) Only an intentional shooting of a free citizen is governed by the objective
reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. The general rule on the
use of lethal force can be written in a classroom: Police officers can use
deadly force only if the threat of serious bodily harm or death is imminent.
(2) To comply with the Fourth Amendment, the use of force must be objectively
reasonable. But the application of that standard to the rough and tumble
topography of the streets creates some uncertainty. Police officers are often
required to make split second decisions in life-threatening situations involving
subjects with firearms, knives, and motor vehicles they are using as weapons.
In qualified immunity, the Supreme Court tipped the margin of error in favor
of the police. So there are two steps in the analysis. First, did the shooting
violate the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable force?
Second, under the specific circumstances the defendant officers confronted
and the information they possessed, could they have reasonably believed that
the shooting complied with clearly established Fourth Amendment law? In
laypersons' terms, could reasonable officers differ on whether the shooting
was justified? Although many of the cases discussed in this article dealt with
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qualified immunity before trial on summary judgment, the reader is reminded
that the defense can continue to be raised through trial.
(3) Besides recurring Fourth Amendment situations (e.g., subjects with guns,
knives and cars), this article addressed recurring Fourth Amendment issues
(e.g., if a warning is required, if multiple shots are excessive force). A
significant issue requiring Supreme Court clarification is when Fourth
Amendment reasonableness scrutiny begins in a self-defense police shooting
case. The plaintiffs theory of the case, developed through expert witnesses
and other evidence, is likely to emphasize the existence of generally accepted
police practices and procedures that could have prevented the shooting. The
defense, on the other hand, will focus on the instant of the shooting itself,
when the police officers had to decide in the blink of an eye to shoot or be
shot. Since the law on the question is not clearly established, the shooting
officers should be granted qualified immunity.
